18ème Commission*

Les aspects juridiques du recours à l'arbitrage par un investisseur contre les autorités de l'Etat hôte en vertu d'un traité interétatique

I. TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES

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Introduction

The present text has been prepared for its examination by the 18th Commission at the September Rhodes Session of the Institute and, if so decided by the Bureau, also for being presented and discussed at the Plenary Session.

At the Naples Session in 2009, three issues were presented and examined by the Commission and subsequently by the Plenary (The Notion of Investment, The Notion of Investor and The Regulatory Measures, Annuaire, vol. 73, p. 541 ff.). The present continuation relates to four additional issues that, also on the basis of the observations by Consoeurs and Confrères in Naples, appeared of special interest in view of the achievement of the 18th Commission work in the Session of 2013.

The four Issues and some related and specific questions are hereby presented in Part I which follows.

Part II contains the General Issues for Considerations. They have already been indicated for the previous session, and the new ones, suggested by the subjects that will be examined at Rhodes, are added thereto.

Part III contains the General Outline which was originally agreed for the work of the 18th Commission, with indication of where the Issues prepared in view of the Naples or Rhodes Session have been included.

PART I
THE FOUR ADDITIONAL ISSUES SELECTED FOR PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION

I. Treaty Claims And Contract Claims
   (Issue D On The General Outline)

1. Definition and preliminary observations

The umbrella clauses (UC) are commonly defined as provisions whose aim is to ensure that each party to an investment treaty (BITs, FTAs) will respect the specific contractual engagements undertaken with nationals of the other party. The inclusion of an UC might have the effect to extend the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the arbitral tribunal foreseen in an international treaty over contractual claims. Still the extent of subject matter differs depending on the wording of the clauses in the BIT and the interpretation of such clauses.

Among the first arbitral tribunals faced with the interpretation of an UC inserted in a BIT was the Tribunal appointed in the ICSID case SGS Société
Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan (actually the earliest case of a tribunal faced with a provision like an UC seems to be the Arbitral Tribunal in the ICSID case Fedax v. Venezuela, 1997). The issue was clearly identified as one of the “core issues” of the case and it was formulated as follows: “Whether Article 11 of the Agreement Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (Pakistan/Switzerland) (11 July 1995) RO 1998 2601, entered into force 6 May 1996 (‘Switzerland–Pakistan BIT’), a so–called ‘umbrella clause’, could transform purely contract claims into BIT claims”.


The interpretation of the UC in the Argentina-US BIT was discussed by the Arbitral Tribunal in the ICSID case PanAmBP v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 2007, and the question was formulated as follows: “The question is whether, through an “umbrella clause”, sometimes also called an “observance-of-undertakings clause”, in a BIT, contract claims of an investor having a contract either with the State or with an autonomous entity are automatically and ipso jure “transformed” in treaty claims benefiting from the dispute settlement mechanism provided for in the BIT”.

The divergent positions are well known in literature and arbitration practice on the extent of such effect determined by an UC. It has been noted that “[t]his question has divided practitioners and legal commentators and remains unsettled in the international arbitral case law” (GAILLARD, New York Law Journal, 2005, quoted in the ICSID case PanAmBP v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections, 2007).

2. Origin and spreading of the UC in the BITs and in the multilateral instruments

It appears worth recalling that the first reference to an UC, also defined “parallel protection” clause, can be traced in the advice rendered in 1953-1954 by Lauterpacht to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with respect to the Iranian oil nationalisation dispute (see SINCLAIR, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection, Arbitration International, 2004, p. 411).

As a distinct investment protection clause, an UC can be first found in the 1956-59 Abs Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection of
Private property Rights in Foreign Countries (Article 4) and in the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Foreign Investment (Article II). An UC also appeared in the well known 1959 first modern BIT between Germany and Pakistan.

Presently, according to YANNACA-SMALL (Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2008) more than 40 % of the BITs in existence contain an UC. However the practice of the States shows that there is no uniform treatment of such clauses in the BITs. UC are often included in the BITs of Switzerland, United Kingdom, Germany and Netherlands, while Canada has never inserted such a clause in its BITs. France presents a reduced percentage of UC in the BITs, and the United States have recently changed their practice with the 2004 US Model BIT, opting for a different language and a reduced use of UC.

With regard to the multilateral conventions on investment protection, the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property provided in its Article 2 an UC, providing that “Each Party shall at all times ensure the observance of undertakings given by it in relation to property of nationals of any other Party”. Commentators on the provision noted that the scope of the clause was to be understood as an application of the general principle of international law *pacta sunt servanda* (cf. Notes and Commentaries accompanying the Convention).

The 1998 draft MAI proposed two formulations of a s.c. “respect clause”: (i) “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has entered into with regard to a specific investment of an investor of another Contracting Party”, and (ii) “Each Contracting Party shall observe any other obligation in writing, it has assumed with regard to investment in its territory by investors of another Contracting Party. Disputes arising from such obligations shall only be settled under the terms of the contracts underlying the obligations”.

The Energy Charter Treaty also provides that (final sentence of Article 10 (1)) “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party”. It is to be mentioned however that the Energy Charter Treaty allows the contracting parties to opt out of this clause and so maintain the protection of the investor limited to the contract provisions (see Articles 26 (3)(c) and 27 (2)).
3. Different versions of UC

It is generally shared the view that a universally agreed model of UC does not exist, and many differences may exist as the specific language they contain and to where they are located into the BITs.

Language

As commonly understood, the UC was originally designed to guarantee by treaty the terms of a contract entered into by a State and an investor. Its purpose was hence to offer an alternative protection to the investor, additional to the dispute settlement mechanism already contained in the contract. The applicability and the broadness and effectiveness of such protection represent the real problem discussed among commentators and arbitrators. The language of many UC is in fact broad and unrestricted, thus becoming often crucial in order to evaluate the effects of those clauses.

Considering Model BITs practice, an UC usually has the following language: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party”. This formulation is quite common in the model BIT of various European countries: see the 1991 UK Model (Article 2(2)); the 2000 Denmark Model (Article 3), the 2002 Sweden Model (Article 2(4)), the Netherlands Model (Article 3 (4)), the German Model (Article 8(2)).

Two common elements of the UC can be traced out of the various BITs: (i) the use of mandatory language, modulated on different degrees and (ii) the fact that the caluses refer to obligations undertaken by the States towards investors and not to obligations between private individuals.

The UC might provide that each contracting party “shall observe” or “shall respect” or “shall guarantee”:

In the Swiss Model BIT the language is: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to ....”.

The 2008 German Model BIT slightly modified the previous language of the UC. Article 8(2) of the former German Model included in a non-derogation article a provision almost identical to the UC found in the majority of European model BITs. Article 8 read: “1. If the legislation of either Contracting State or obligations under international law [...] contain a regulation [...] entitling investments by investors of the other Contracting State to a treatment more favourable than is provided for by this Treaty, such regulation shall to the extent that it is more favourable prevail over this Treaty.

2. Each Contracting State shall observe any other obligation it has assumed with regard to investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting State”.
Article 7 (2) of the latest 2008 German Model now reads as follows: “Each Contracting State shall fulfil any other obligations it may have entered into with regard to ...”.

In the former US Model the UC was similar to the Swiss and German models: “Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered with regard to...”. The same language was in the 1991 US-Argentina BIT, in the 1991 Dutch-Polish BIT Relevant in the Eureko case, the 1998 France-Mexico BIT.

However the clause is no more present in the 2004 US Model BIT. No UC can be traced in the Model BIT of France, Canada and Norway. It is to be noted that the 2006 French Model BIT (Article 9) provides as follows: “Investments having formed the subject of a special commitment of one Contracting Party, with respect to the nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party, shall be governed, without prejudice to the provisions of this Agreement, by the terms of the said commitment if the latter includes provisions more favourable than those of this Agreement”.

Some BITs provide a more ambiguous language, thus leaving room for diverging interpretations. The Swiss-Pakistani BIT, at the basis of the already mentioned ICSID case SGS v. Pakistan, reads as follows (Article 11): “Chacune des Parties Contractantes assure à tout moment le respect des engagements assumés par elle à l’égard des investissements des investisseurs de l’autre Partie Contractante”.

The UC might refer to “commitments” or “any obligation” or “any other obligation”. In particular the wording “any obligation” has been commented in the case Eureko BV v. Poland (Partial Award, 2005), where the Arbitration Tribunal affirmed that the expression “‘Any obligations is capacious, it means not only obligations of a certain type, but ‘any’ – that is to say, all – obligations entered into with regard to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party”.

Some UC refer to more precisely identified obligations, as in the case of the BITs concluded by Australia, or Mexico, or Austria: their provisions refer to “written obligations”, or “contractual obligations”, or “obligations [the Contracting Parties] have entered into with regard to investments”.

Consequences of different locations of the UC in the BIT

A number of BITs place the UC among other provisions specifying the substantive protection guaranteed by the Treaty. Others include the UC in a provision referring to “other commitments”, thus distinguishing the UC from the basic provisions on investment protection. Generally, in those cases, the UC is however placed before the dispute resolution clauses provided by the BIT.
Some tribunals have considered that the location of the UC in the BIT has a particular significance in relation to the interpretation of the clause.

In the case *SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Pakistan*, the Arbitral Tribunal noted that (paras 169-170 and 177): “Another consideration that appears to us to support our reading of Article 11 of the BIT, is the location of Article 11 in the BIT. The context of Article 11 includes the structure and content of the rest of the Treaty. We note that Article 11 is not placed together with the substantive obligations undertaken by the Contracting Parties in Articles Investment Claims (...).

*Given the above structure and sequence of the rest of the Treaty, we consider that, had Switzerland and Pakistan intended Article 11 to embody a substantive “first order” standard obligation, they would logically have placed Article 11 among the substantive “first order” obligations set out in Articles 3 to 7. The separation of Article 11 from those obligations by the subrogation article and the two dispute settlement provisions (Articles 9 and 10), indicates to our mind that Article 11 was not meant to project a substantive obligation like those set out in Articles 3 to 7, let alone one that could, when read as SGS asks us to read it, supersede and render largely redundant the substantive obligations provided for in Articles 3 to 7. (...)*

“The appropriate interpretive approach is the prudential one summed up in the literature as in dubio pars mitior est sequenda, or more tersely, in dubio mitius.”.

In the *PanAmBP v. Argentina* case, the claimants supported its position, referring to “(...) the position of the umbrella clause within the Treaty which, unlike what was the case in the Swiss-Pakistani context, is placed among the “first-order standard obligations”. This proves, according to the Claimants, that it was the intention of the Contracting Parties to convert claims based on mere contractual relations between investors and the host State into treaty claims”.

In the ICSID case *Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Egypt*, 2004, the Tribunal observed that “it could not be held that an umbrella clause inserted in the Treaty, and not very prominently, could have the effect of transforming all contract disputes into investment disputes under the Treaty” and “The connection between the Contract and the Treaty is the missing link that prevents any such effect”.

On the contrary some tribunals held that the location of the UC has only a limited significance. In the case *SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines*, the Arbitral Tribunal considered that the placement of the UC might have “some weight (...) but the Tribunal does not regard the
location of the provision as decisive, having regard to the other considerations recited above. In particular, it is difficult to accept that the same language in other Philippines BITs is legally operative, but that it is legally inoperative in the Swiss–Philippines BIT merely because of its location”.

In the Ad-Hoc Arbitration in the case Eureko BV v. Poland, the Tribunal considered that “insofar as the placement of the umbrella clause in the BIT among the substantive obligations or with the final clauses – is of any significance (in this Tribunal’s view, little), it should be noted that Article 3.5 of the BIT between the Netherlands and Poland places its umbrella clause amidst the rendering of the Parties’ substantive obligations”.

4. The interpretation of the UC by the Arbitral Tribunals: the main lines

Four main lines of interpretation of an UC can be identified.

a) The UC automatically transforms a contractual obligation into an international obligation

In Fedax v. Venezuela (1998), the Arbitral Tribunal concluded that Venezuela was “under the obligation to honour precisely the terms and conditions governing such investment, laid down mainly in Article 3 of the Agreement” on the basis that Article 3 (4) of the BIT between Netherlands and Venezuela provided as follows: “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to the treatment of investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party”.

In Impregilo v. Pakistan (2005), the Tribunal stated that (para. 258): “the fact that a breach may give rise to a contract claim does not mean that it cannot also – and separately – give rise to a treaty claim. Even if the two perfectly coincide, they remain analytically distinct, and necessarily require different enquiries”. A similar statement was in the case Consortium RFCC v. Kingdom of Morocco (2003): “Une telle violation peut certes résulter d’une violation du contrat, mais sans qu’une éventuelle violation du contrat ne constitue, ipso jure et en elle-même, une violation du Traité, comme le Tribunal l’a rappelé ci-dessus”.

Having regard to the positive effect of the UC with regard to an investment contract, the Dissenting Opinion by Crivellaro, in the ICSID 2004 case SGS Société Générale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines, is to be mentioned. The dissent was limited to one Section of the Award and was focused on the effects of the BIT between Switzerland and the Philippines entered into force in 1997, some years after the conclusion of the investment contract. Crivellaro noted that (paras. 2, 5, 10): “The BIT has created a completely new law and has conferred on SGS new or additional rights of forum selection. They include, in particular, the right to select the forum after that
the dispute has arisen”. As a consequence “the really innovating contribution of a BIT is given by the investor's privilege to chose a preferential forum amongst those offered by the host State after that the dispute has arisen (together with, when stipulated, the s.c. “umbrella clause”). The practical significance of the BITs would, in my opinion, seriously diminish if such particular privilege, which is the most attractive to foreign investors, is put into doubt or denied”. Therefore “when a provision which is intended to confer an advantage to a certain party, here Article VIII (2), may have two meanings, one should retain the meaning which is less restrictive or more favourable to the beneficiary. The grantor and, respectively, the beneficiary of the more favourable treatment are still the same parties who agreed on Article 12 of the CISS Agreement, the Philippines and SGS. As between these two parties, the rule giving prevalence to the most favourable treatment certainly applies. It is in this principle that one should find the rule of interpretation which best harmonizes with the BIT essential purposes”.

In the case Lemire v. Ukraine, the Tribunal agreed in principle with the claimant’s assertion, stating that (para. 498): “Article II.3 (c) of the BIT [“Each party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments”] brings the Settlement Agreement into the ambit of the BIT, so that any violation of the private law agreement becomes ipso iure a violation of the international law BIT”, even if this conclusion did not have any significance for determining the award.

In the 2009 case BIVAC v. Paraguay, the Tribunal held that (para. 141) “The words “any obligation” are all encompassing. They are not limited to international obligations, or non-contractual obligations, so that they appear without apparent limitation with respect to commitments that impose legal obligations. On a plain meaning they are undoubtedly capable of being read to include a contractual arrangement entered into by BIVAC and the Ministry of Finance of Paraguay, whereby the alleged breaches of the Ministry are attributable to the State”.

SHIHATA (Applicable Law in International Arbitration: Specific Aspects in Case of the Involvement of State Parties, 1995) observed that the treaties containing an UC “elevate contractual undertakings into international law obligations”.

It has been affirmed by SCHREUER (Travelling the BIT Route: of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, Journal of World Investments, 2004) that the UC “add the compliance with investment contracts, or other undertakings of the host State, to the BIT’s substantive standards. In this way, a violation of such a contract becomes a violation of the BIT”.
b) The effect of the UC is limited to the State’s iure imperii acts

In the case *PanAm BP v. Argentina*, the Tribunal concluded that (paras. 96-112) “In this Tribunal’s view, it is necessary to distinguish the State as a merchant from the State as a sovereign. (...) In the Tribunal’s view, this umbrella clause does not extent its jurisdiction over any contract claims that the Claimants might present as stemming solely from the breach of a contract between the investor and the Argentina State or an Argentine autonomous entity. (...) The view that it is essentially from the State as a sovereign that the foreign investors have to be protected through the availability of international arbitration is confirmed, in the Tribunal’s opinion, by the language in the new 2004 US Model BIT, which clearly elevates only the contract claims stemming from an investment agreement stricto sensu, that is, an agreement in which the State appears as a sovereign, and not all contracts signed with the State or one of its entities, to the level of treaty claims, as results from its Article 24(1)(a).

In the case *El Paso Energy v. Argentina*, the Tribunal held that the UC, even if drafted as broadly as possible, can only confer jurisdiction to an arbitral tribunal on the basis of a BIT when the State is acting in its capacity as a sovereign authority.

In *Impregilo v. Pakistan*, the Tribunal noted that (para. 260) “the State or its emanation, may have behaved as an ordinary contracting party having a difference of approach, in fact or in law, with the investor. In order that the alleged breach of contract may constitute a violation of the BIT, it must be the result of behaviour going beyond that which an ordinary contracting party could adopt. Only the State in the exercise of its sovereign authority ("puissance publique"), and not as a contracting party, may breach the obligations assumed under the BIT. In other words, the investment protection treaty only provides a remedy to the investor where the investor proves that the alleged damages were a consequence of the behaviour of the Host State acting in breach of the obligations it had assumed under the treaty”. In conclusion, declining to exercise its jurisdiction over the contract claims presented by the claimant, the Tribunal held that (para. 262) “the overlap or coincidence of treaty and contract claims does not mean that the exercise of determining each will also be the same”.

c) The UC should be interpreted restrictively

In the famous case *SGS v. Pakistan*, according to the complex evaluation made by the Arbitral Tribunal, the UC is to be read in a narrow manner. The Tribunal stated that (paras 163-174) “The consequences of accepting the Claimant’s reading of Article 11 of the BIT should be spelled out in some detail. Firstly, Article 11 would amount to incorporating by reference an unlimited number of State contracts, as well as other municipal law
instruments setting out State commitments including unilateral commitments to an investor of the other Contracting Party. Any alleged violation of those contracts and other instruments would be treated as a breach of the BIT. Secondly, the Claimant's view of Article 11 tends to make Articles 3 to 7 of the BIT substantially superfluous. There would be no real need to demonstrate a violation of those substantive treaty standards if a simple breach of contract, or of municipal statute or regulation, by itself, would suffice to constitute a treaty violation on the part of a Contracting Party and engage the international responsibility of the Party. A third consequence would be that an investor may, at will, nullify any freely negotiated dispute settlement clause in a State contract. On the reading of Article 11 urged by the Claimant, the benefits of the dispute settlement provisions of a contract with a State also a party to a BIT, would flow only to the investor. For that investor could always defeat the State's invocation of the contractually specified forum, and render any mutually agreed procedure of dispute settlement, other than BIT–specified ICSID arbitration, a dead–letter, at the investor's choice. The investor would remain free to go to arbitration either under the contract or under the BIT. But the State party to the contract would be effectively precluded from proceeding to the arbitral forum specified in the contract unless the investor was minded to agree. The Tribunal considers that Article 11 of the BIT should be read in such a way as to enhance mutuality and balance of benefits in the inter–relation of different agreements located in differing legal orders. We believe, for the foregoing considerations, that Article 11 of the BIT would have to be considerably more specifically worded before it can reasonably be read in the extraordinarily expansive manner submitted by the Claimant. (...) The appropriate interpretive approach is the prudential one summed up in the literature as in dubio pars mitior est sequenda, or more tersely, in dubio mitius”. Conclusively, the Tribunal came to the result that it did not have jurisdiction over contract claims “which do not also constitute or amount to breaches of the substantive standards of the BIT”.

In the case Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. Egypt, the Tribunal concluded also negatively stating that (pars. 71-82): “In this context, it could not be held that an umbrella clause inserted in the Treaty, and not very prominently, could have the effect of transforming all contract disputes into investment disputes under the Treaty, unless of course there would be a clear violation of the Treaty rights and obligations or a violation of contract rights of such a magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection, which is not the case. The connection between the Contract and the Treaty is the missing link that prevents any such effect. This might be perfectly different in other cases where that link is found to exist, but certainly it is not the case here.
The Tribunal concludes therefore that, even if for the sake of argument there was an investment in this case, the absence of a Treaty-based claim, and the evidence that, on the contrary, all claims are contractual, justifies the finding that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction”.

In this respect, it is to be mentioned the well known opinion expressed by MAYER (La neutralisation du pouvoir normative de l’Etat en matière de contrats d’Etat, JDI, 1986), according to which the nature of the relationship between the parties (investor and State) remain unchanged and is subject to the lex contractus and only the inter-State relationship is subject to international law: “il existe deux rapports distincts et parallèles: le rapport inter partes, entre parties au contrat d’Etat, qui reste soumis à la lex contractus, et le rapport interétatique, qui relève du droit des gens. Que la violation par l’Etat de ses obligations nées du contrat constitue en même temps la violation du traité ne suffit pas à altérer la nature de l’un ou de l’autre”.

d) The fourth view

A fourth view held that umbrella clauses may form the basis for treaty claims, without transforming contractual claims into treaty claims. Such view is described in the 2009 case Toto v. Lebanon, where the Tribunal held that (para 201): “That view best conforms with the unqualified commitment assumed by Lebanon to comply with "any other obligation it has assumed" as well as with the fourth paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty which confirms the importance of the "contractual protection" of investments - again without further qualification”.

This position has been expressed by CRAWFORD (Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration), suggesting that an umbrella clause is operative and may form the basis for a substantive treaty claim, but “it does not convert a contractual claim into a treaty claim. On the one hand it provides, or at least may provide, a basis for a treaty claim even if the BIT in question contains not generic claims clause; on the other hand, the umbrella clause does not change the proper law of the contract or its legal incidents, including provisions for dispute settlement”.

The distinction between “Treaty claims and Contract claims” has been criticised by FADLALLAH (La distinction ‘Treaty claims-Contract claims’ et la compétence de l’arbitre (CIRDI : Faisons nous fausse route ?), Cahier de l’arbitrage, 2004) who affirmed that it could provoke a negative fragmentation of the dispute. In this context the question might be posed : “à quoi sert l’umbrella clause si elle se limite aux obligations résultant du traité ?”.

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5. Problems connected with the interpretation of the UC

- Can contractual rights be included in the notion of “investment”?
- How broad is the extent of the protection provided by an UC?
- How can purely contractual aspects of a claim be identified?
- Does the jurisdictional clause inserted in a BIT refer to “any dispute”, thus including also the contract issues and not only the treaty issues? (cf. the arbitral decision in the Joy Mining case)
- How can the applicable law be determined? (cf. the arbitral decision in the Vivendi case)
- Can the umbrella clause be invoked against a State, when the investor claims the breach of a contractual obligation which has been entered into by a public entity and not by the State itself? (cf. the arbitral decision in the case EDF v. Romania, 2009).

6. Basic references

MAYER, La neutralisation du pouvoir normative de l’Etat en matière de contrats d’Etat, JDI, 1986

DOLZER, STEVENS, Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1995


GAILLARD, L’arbitrage sur le fondement des traits de protection des investissements, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 2003


SCHREUER, Travelling the BIT Route: of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, Journal of World Investments, 2004


YANNACA-SMALL, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, 2006

II. The MFN Clause and its Application to the Procedural Substantive Rights on the Investor (Issue G.1 on the General Outline)

1. Definition and preliminary observations

The MFN Clause was defined by the International Law Commission as “a treaty provision whereby a State undertakes the obligation towards another State to accord most-favoured nation treatment in an agreed sphere of relations” (see Article 4 of the 1978 Draft Articles on Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses with Commentaries, Text adopted at its 30th Session, 1978). Although MFN has traditionally been linked to trade agreements, in the 1950s when the first BITs were concluded, its use became common also in the practice of international investment agreements. In particular, in the field of investment agreements MFN is generally identified as the provision according to which an investor from a party to an agreement, or its investment, would be treated by the other party “no less favourably” than an investor from any third country, or its investment, with respect to a given subject-matter. Therefore it could become crucial for guaranteeing the equality of competitive opportunities between investors of different countries, preventing discrimination against foreign investors on grounds of their nationality. The MFN is however connected and limited by the eiusdem generis principle, according to which the clause can only attract matters belonging to the same subject matter or the same category of subject matters it is related to.

MFN is a standard of treatment having its roots in international law and generally linked to the principle of the equality of States. In 1952 the ICJ expressed the view that the purpose of a MFN clause was to “maintain at all times fundamental equality without discrimination among all of the countries concerned” (Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of United States of America in Morocco, France v. USA, 1952, p. 192).
For a long time it has been considered less relevant than other standards of treatment (the principle of national treatment, for instance) until recent years when it became the object of various investment disputes, with arbitral tribunals issuing divergent opinions. One of the most controversial aspect of the MNF clause was focused on the issue whether it can be used to “broaden the scope of an investor’s procedural and substantive rights” beyond and in addition to the protection clauses already included in the agreement (cf. Investor-State Disputes Arising From Investment Treaties: a Review, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2005, p. 36).

2. The MFN Clause in BITs, Free Trade Agreements and other multilateral instruments

The MFN standard is a core provision of most BITs, where it is inserted together with other investment-related issues and standards. This determines possible interactive effects with, for instance, host country operational measures, the principle of national treatment, the fair and equitable treatment.

When referred to investments the MFN Clauses essentially present the same basic structure and character. In the case Rent 4 et al. v. Russia (cf. para. 77) the Tribunal examined the substance of the MFN debate, observing that the treaty that contains the MNF clause is conventionally identified as “the basic treaty”, while the treaty invoked as evidence of a more favourable treatment is referred to as the “comparator treaty”. The party (the investor) who claims to be entitled to a different treatment on the basis of the MFN Clause is a stranger to the comparator treaty and “therefore [is] in no position to make any claim under it. The claim can arise only under the basic treaty”. See in this regard the International Law Commission’s 1978 Draft Articles on MFN Clauses.

The MFN clause, in the context of international investments, is reciprocal between the (State) Parties, unconditional and related to the whole lifetime of the investment. It will cover the various operations connected to the investment, namely operation, maintenance, use or sale or liquidation of an investment. Even if the Clauses use a different language, the basic thrust of the MFN principle remains unchanged, thus affirming a non discriminating commitment among foreign investors operating in a host country. In the operative, MFN clause is therefore characterized by its relative nature,
lacking any *a priori* content and covering any discrimination by reason of nationality.

In most cases the MFN treatment is granted both to the investor and to the investment. This is the case of the NAFTA (Article 1103), the US 2004 Model BIT, the Norway 2007 Model BIT and of the German 2008 Model BIT. With regard to investments Article 3 of the latter provides that “(1) Neither Contracting State shall in its territory subject investments owned or controlled by investors of the other Contracting State to treatment less favourable than it accords to investments of its own investors or to investments of investors of any third State” and then with regard to investors similarly provides that “(2) Neither Contracting State shall in its territory subject investors of the other Contracting State, as regards their activity in connection with investments, to treatment less favourable than it accords to its own investors or to investors of any third State”.

In other cases the MFN treatment is accorded only to the investment, as in the case of the French 2006 Model BIT, whose Article 4 provides that “Each Contracting Party shall apply (...) to the nationals and companies of the other Party, with respect to their investments and activities related to the investments, a treatment not less favorable than that granted to its nationals or companies, or the treatment granted to the nationals or companies of the most favored nation, if the latter is more favourable”, or in the case of the Colombia 2007 Model BIT, which provides (Article IV) that “Each Contracting Party shall grant to the investments of investors of the other Contracting Party made in its territory, a not less favourable treatment than that accorded, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors or to investors of any other third State, whichever is more favourable to the investor”.

With regard to the activities covered by the MFN Clause, the standard of treatment is generally broad in order to cover all possible investment activities. It might use a rather general language, simply referring to “investment activities” (as in the Japan-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, Article 59) or defining the various activities, making reference to “the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments” as in the NAFTA (Article 1103), or to the “[investment] related activities including management, maintenance,
use, enjoyment or disposal”, as in the Energy Charter Treaty (Article 10.7), or “establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, liquidation, sale, transfer or other disposition of investments”, as in Article 4 (Chapter 11) of the ASEAN. It is to be noted that the investment treaty might apply the MFN standard only after the investment is made (as in the case of the Energy Charter Treaty) or even since the moment of its establishment (pre- and post-entry model clause, adopted in NAFTA or other model BITs, see OECD, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment in International Investment Law, No. 2004/2, 2004).

With regard to the qualification of the “treatment” given by the States, which could be subject to the limits of the MFN Clause, it is generally understood that the provision applies only to “general treatment” and not to “individual practice”. It has been affirmed that “freedom of contract prevails over MFN standard” (Most Favoured-Nation Treatment, UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, 1999, p. 7). Furthermore the MFN standard implies a similarity in the field of operation where the treatment is accorded. Hence, the MFN standard cannot prevent States from granting different treatment in different sectors of economic activity or to enterprises of different size.

3. The exceptions to the MFN Treatment

There is a general understanding that exceptions to the MFN treatment are needed to reduce its very broad scope of application. The extent of the exceptions varies in the different treaties, but it is generally understood that they might apply in the field of social and labour activities, taxation, environmental protection, intellectual property rights, agriculture and air and maritime transportation.

In particular there are BITs that allow the contracting parties to derogate and exclude the application of the MFN standard for reasons of public order, public health or public morality (see the Energy Charter Treaty, whose Article 24, paras. 2 and 3, provides for exceptions to specific rules of the Treaty which are necessary “to protect human, animal or plant life or health” and “for the protection of [a Contracting Party’s] essential security interests”. It is to be noted that the exception based on national security reason is quite unusual in BITs. However the German Model BIT provides under Article 3, para. 2, that “Measures that have to be taken for reasons of public security and order shall not be deemed treatment less favourable within the meaning of this Article”.

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Most investment agreements provide derogation to the MFN clause based on reciprocity, mostly with regard to taxation matters and intellectual property rights (cf. Canada Model BIT at Article 9, para. 4 “In respect of intellectual property rights, a Party may derogate from Articles 3 and 4 in a manner that is consistent with the WTO Agreement”). However, particularly with regard to taxation, a recent case demonstrated that the mere wording “the provisions of the present agreement will not apply to taxation” is not sufficient to exclude all claims connected to taxation from the operation of a MFN (cf. Renta 4 et al. v. Russia, para. 74). On the issue, see the ICSID awards Encana v. Ecuador (Decision on Jurisdiction of 27 February 2004) and Duke Energy v. Ecuador (Award of 18 August 2008) and most recently Burlington Resources v. Ecuador (Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 June 2010) where the Tribunal had to decide whether claimant’s claims involved “matters of taxation”, and then consider to review whether those claims related to the observance and enforcement of an “investment agreement” within the meaning of Article X(2)(c) of the 1997 USA-Ecuador BIT in relation to the Tribunal jurisdiction.

Furthermore exceptions are provided in the case of regional economic integration organisations (also known as REIO Clause): this determines that the Member Countries of a REIO have the possibility to derogate to the MFN treatment obligation assumed towards non Member States. The German Model BIT provides that (Article 3, para. 3) “Such treatment shall not relate to privileges which either Contracting State accords to investors of third States on account of its membership of, or association with, a customs or economic union, a common market or a free trade area”.

4. MFN Clauses and their effects on substantive and procedural rights of investment protection

a) MFN treatment applied to substantive issues

The MFN standard in international law is traditionally linked to the treatment of foreign goods and persons (cf. GATS Agreement). When the substantive issues of non discriminatory treatment are concerned, MFN clauses might concern various aspects of the investment mainly focused on how the host State treats foreign investors or investments. There are clauses which provide for the regular returns on the investment, or the transfer of payments, or for a non-discriminatory treatment as a consequence of expropriation/nationalisation measures adopted by the host State, or for the coverage of particular events, like war or civil disturbance as in the case of some US BITs which might state “Each Party shall accord national and most favoured nation treatment to covered investment as regards any measure relating to losses that investments suffer in its territory owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emergency,
insurrection, civil disturbance, or similar events” (Article 4 of the 2000 BIT US-Bolivia).

Many ICSID cases dealt with the application of the MFN principle in relation to liability standards. C.f. AAPL v. Sri Lanka, Award of 27 June 1990, and later CMS v. Argentina, Award of 20 April 2005, Luchetti v. Peru, Award of 7 February 2005, MTD v. Chile, Award of 21 May 2004. The MFN issue appeared also in two NAFTA cases: Pope & Talbot v. Canada, 2001, and ADF v. USA, 2003. The latter reconsidered the principle expressed in Pope & Talbot (“NAFTA investors and investments that would be denied access to the fairness elements untrammelled by the 'egregious' conduct threshold that Canada would graft onto Article 1105, would simply turn to Articles 1102 and 1103 for relief”, para. 117), but eventually rejected claimant’s claim, excluding the subject matter from the scope of operation of NAFTA’s MFN Clause. In the 2008 Award in the case Rumeli Telekom v. Kazakhastan, the Tribunal declared that the host State was liable for a violation of the FET that the Tribunal had incorporated based on the MFN Clause in the Turkey-Kazakhastan BIT, deriving from the host State’s third-party BITs, particularly from the UK-Kazakhastan BIT.

More recently, the Arbitral Tribunal in the ICSID 2009 Award Bayindir v. Pakistan relied on the MFN provision contained in the Pakistan-Turkey BIT to import the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard found in other treaties signed by Pakistan, stating that “the basis for importing an FET obligation into the Treaty is provided by its MFN clause” (para. 164). In that case the provision containing the MFN treatment (Article II(2) of the BIT) read as follows: “Each Party shall accord to these investments, once established, treatment no less favourable than that accorded in similar situations to investments of its investors or to investments of investors of any third country, whichever is the most favourable”. The Tribunal stated that the ordinary meaning of the applicable MFN clause demonstrated that the contracting parties “did not intend to exclude the importation of a more favorable substantive standard of treatment accorded to the investors of third countries” (cf. paras. 156-157). Moreover, it noted that the fact that the FET provision referred to by the claimant pre-dates the MFN clause in the Pakistan-Turkey BIT does not appear to preclude the importation of an FET obligation from another BIT concluded by the respondent.

Moreover the Tribunal had to deal with an allegation of discrimination in violation of the MFN clause. On this issue, the Tribunal noted that the MFN clause is not limited to regulatory treatment but also applies to the manner in which a state concludes an investment contract and/or exercises its rights thereunder (para. 388, also referring to the 2005 Decision on Jurisdiction in the same case). The claimant had argued that, though there had been several
other projects (some of which were run by foreign contractors) that had not been completed in time, the claimant was the only contractor to be expelled. The Tribunal dismissed the MFN claim because the claimant had failed to prove the “similarity of the situations” at the level of contractual terms and circumstances among the several projects (cf. para. 420). This requirement might be unproblematic, if the treaties involved concern the mutual promotion and protection.

b) MFN treatment applied to jurisdictional matters

As to procedural aspects of the application of the MFN standard, arbitral tribunals have been frequently faced with the issue of determining whether MFN clauses allow investors to rely on shorter waiting periods in third-country BITs or be granted to avoid the requirement to pursue local remedies for a limited time before initiating arbitration (mainly ICSID). Arbitral case-law has generally accepted that investors circumvent this requirement, making recourse to more favourable provisions contained in third-party treaties.

The first and well known case where an ICSID arbitral tribunal has analyzed the MFN treatment in the matter of investments was Maffezini v. Spain in 2000. This became a landmark-case for all the following case-law. The basic assumption of the Tribunal was the following: “if a third party treaty contains provisions for the settlement of disputes that are more favorable to the protection of the investor’s rights and interests than those in the basic treaty, such provisions may be extended to the beneficiary of the most favored nation clause as they are fully compatible with the ejusdem generis principle” (cf. para. 56). The Tribunal observed however that “It is clear, in any event, that a distinction has to be made between the legitimate extension of rights and benefits by means of the operation of the clause, on the one hand, and disruptive treaty-shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions, on the other hand” (para. 63).

As to the issue of the expiration of the waiting periods prior to arbitration, the Tribunal introduced some exceptions in order to avoid perceived negative effects of a broad application of MFN clauses to investor-State dispute settlement (“disruptive treaty-shopping that would play havoc with the policy objectives of underlying specific treaty provisions”, para. 63).

A MFN Clause was contained in the Germany-Argentina BIT, referred to in the ICSID case Siemens v. Argentina (2004), where the Tribunal first noted that in the BIT concerned “the formulation is narrower but (...) the term “treatment” and the phrase “activities related to the investments” are sufficiently wide to include settlement of disputes” (para. 103). Therefore the Tribunal stated that “the Treaty itself, together with so many other treaties of investment protection, has as a distinctive feature special dispute settlement
mechanisms not normally open to investors. Access to these mechanisms is part of the protection offered under the Treaty. It is part of the treatment of foreign investors and investments and of the advantages accessible through a MFN clause” (para. 102).

The danger of the s.c. “treaty shopping” was considered with a certain criticism in the case _Plama v. Bulgaria_ (ICSID, 2005). The Tribunal observed that “Doubt may be further created by the scope of the dispute settlement provisions in the other BITs. A number of them refer to disputes arising out of the particular BIT” and thus “[i]t appears to be difficult to interpret the MFN clause as importing into the particular BIT such specific language from other BITs”. Moreover in the Tribunal’s view “[w]hen concluding a multilateral or bilateral investment treaty with specific dispute resolution provisions, states cannot be expected to leave those provisions to future (partial) replacement by different dispute resolution provisions through the operation of an MFN provision unless the States have explicitly agreed thereto” (para. 212). In this decision, the Tribunal also commented that the international law cases examined by the arbitrators to reach a decision in the Maffezini case (namely the _Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of America in Morocco_, the _Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case_, and the _Ambatielos Claim_) “do not provide a conclusive answer to the question” of the extension of the MFN Clause. The Tribunal in _Plama_ also denied that the purpose of the harmonisation of dispute settlement provisions cannot be achieved by reliance on MFN provision (cf. para. 219), considering that “an investor has the option to pick and choose provisions from the various BITs. If that were true, a host state which has not specifically agreed thereto can be confronted with a large number of permutations of dispute settlement provisions from the various BITs which it has concluded. Such a chaotic situation – actually counterproductive to harmonization – cannot be the presumed intent of Contracting Parties”.

However, the “harmonisation effect” has been most recently recognized by some authors, who confirmed that MFN clauses “multilateralize the bilateral inter-State treaty relationship and harmonize the protection of foreign investments in a specific host State” (cf. SHILL, The Multilateralization of International Investment Law, Cambridge, 2010, p. 121 ff.).

A quite restrictive view has been expressed by the Arbitral Tribunal in the case _Wintershall Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine_, ICSID Award (2008): “ordinarily and without more, the prospect of an investor selecting at will from an assorted variety of options provided in other treaties negotiated with other parties under different circumstances, dislodges the dispute resolution provision in the basic treaty itself – unless of course the MFN Clause in the
basic treaty clearly and unambiguously indicates that it should be so interpreted: which is not so in the present case.” (para. 167).

In the recent case *Tza Yap Shum v. Peru* (2009), the Tribunal refused to permit the claimant to invoke the MFN clause in the China-Peru BIT, in order to establish a jurisdictional basis for the dispute. The Tribunal argued that “Since the Contracting Parties specifically established the possibility of submitting “other matters” to ICSID arbitration and since they have established specifically such occurrence in the wording of the BIT, we, the Tribunal, conclude that it is our duty to give the BIT wording the meaning it was really intended. As a result, the Tribunal hereby determines that the specific wording of Article 8(3) should prevail over the general wording of the MFN clause in Article 3 and Claimant’s arguments on the contrary must be dismissed” (cf. para. 216).

In the case *Renta 4 et al. v. Russia* (2009), under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the Tribunal accepted the general proposition that MFN clauses may extend the tribunal’s jurisdiction beyond the scope of the underlying treaty’s jurisdictional clause. However the Tribunal by majority ultimately decided that the specific MFN clause in the Spain-Union Soviet Socialist Republics BIT could not be read to enlarge the competence of the Tribunal.

A positive solution as to the extension of the MFN Clause was expressed by the Tribunal in the case *Gas Natural v. Argentine*, Decision on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction (2005): “the issue of applying a general most-favored-nation clause to the dispute resolution provisions of bilateral investment treaties is not free from doubt”. The Tribunal declared to be “satisfied, however, that the terms of the BIT between Spain and Argentina show that dispute resolution was included within the scope of most-favored-nation treatment, and that our analysis (...) is consistent with the current thinking as expressed in other recent arbitral awards. We remain persuaded that assurance of independent international arbitration is an important – perhaps the most important – element in investor protection. Unless it appears clearly that the state parties to a BIT or the parties to a particular investment agreement settled on a different method for resolution of disputes that may arise, most-favored-nation provisions in BITs should be understood to be applicable to dispute settlement”.

Similarly in the case *Suez v. Argentine*, Decision on Jurisdiction (2006), the Tribunal observed that: “after an analysis of the substantive provisions of the BITs in question, the Tribunal finds no basis for distinguishing dispute settlement matters from any other matters covered by a bilateral investment treaty. From the point of view of the promotion and protection of investments, the stated purposes of the Argentina-Spain BIT, dispute settlement is as
important as other matters governed by the BIT and is an integral part of the investment protection regime that two sovereign states, Argentina and Spain, have agreed upon”. The Tribunal concluded that “Claimants InterAguas and AGBAR, relying on Article IV of the Argentina-Spain BIT, may invoke the more favorable treatment afforded in the Argentina-France BIT and may therefore bring an ICSID arbitration without the necessity of first having recourse to the local courts of Argentina” (para. 66).

It is to be noted that the more recent practice of the States in negotiating BITs seems to be critical towards the application of the MFN Clause to dispute settlement. Particularly the practice of Canada and US in BIT and Free Trade Agreements now includes provisions that limit MFN treatment to substantive investment protection and often expressly exclude MFN Clauses to investor-State dispute settlement. Article 10.4(2) of the Draft Central American-US Free Trade Agreement provides that the parties agree that the MFN Clause inserted in their treaty “does not encompass international dispute resolution mechanisms” and therefore could not “lead to conclusions similar to the Maffezini case”. Moreover, the 2007 Norway Model BIT introduced a clear provision stating: “For greater certainty, treatment referred to in paragraph [1] does not encompass dispute resolution mechanisms provided for in this Agreement or other International Agreements” (Article 4, para. 3).

5. Questions related to the interpretation and application of MFN Clauses

- Is the MFN clause to be interpreted in its broader sense including the provision on the settlement of disputes even when it is referred to the “treatment”?
- Are the requirements of prior recourse to local courts a substantive or procedural provision?
- Is a waiting period necessary for the investor after the exhaustion of the local remedies and prior to the submission before an international arbitration tribunal?
- Are expropriation claims to be included in a MFN Clause when the Clause itself is generally referred to disputes between the Contracting Parties of a BIT?
- Is the principle “expression unius est exclusion alterius” valid in interpreting the MFN Clause?
- Considering that some States, by virtue of the accession to the EU, argue that intra-EU BITs are terminated, is there any consequence on the applicability of the MFN Clause?
− The Tribunal in *Plama v. Bulgaria* posed the following question: “But what if one BIT provides for UNCITRAL arbitration and another provides for ICSID? Which is more favourable?”. Can the MFN Clause be applied to the selection of an arbitration system?

6. **Basic references**

GAILLARD, Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-Favored-Nation Clause, NYLJ, 2005

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III. The Fair & Equitable Treatment (FET)

(Issue G.2.c on the General Outline)

1. **Definition and preliminary observations**

Originated as a treaty clause containing a declaration of principles, the Fair and Equitable Standard (FET) is one of the key standards of investment protection. According to this provision foreign investments are granted by the host State a treatment in compliance to a minimum standard of fairness, irrespective of the standards the host State applies to domestic investment under its national law. It has been noted that an unfair and unequitable treatment by the host State towards the investor, determining the impairment of his property rights or his capacity to develop the investment, might be considered a new type of expropriation (BRONFMAN, Fair and Equitable Treatment: an Evolving Standard, Max Planck YUNL, 2006, p. 610 ff.)
FET has been frequently invoked in investment disputes with a remarkable relevance in the arbitration practice. A great number of claims have been successfully grounded on the violation of FET by the host State for a broad range of measures. The problematic issue in applying the FET standard is the broadness of the clause interpretation, determining limits of application of the FET. Most investment agreements include the FET standard, but they do not specify its exact meaning or the criteria to be applied to determine the effects of the FET in relation to the measures adopted by the host State towards the investment. Therefore arbitral tribunals have been frequently involved in determining “whether the obligation to grant “fair and equitable treatment” is synonymous with the minimum standard of treatment of foreign investment required under customary international law, or whether it means something different – albeit with some overlap” (Identifying Core Elements in Investment Agreements in the APEC Region, UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 2008).

In relation to the meaning and content of the FET, the opinion of Mann expressed in 1981 is well known and was repeatedly commented by other authors: “the term ‘fair and equitable treatment’ envisages conduct far beyond a minimum standard and affords protection to a greater extent and according to a much more objective standard than any previously employed form of words. A tribunal would not be concerned with a minimum, maximum or average standard. It will have to decide whether in all circumstances the conduct in issue is fair and equitable or unfair and inequitable. (…) The terms are to be understood and applied independently and autonomously.”

However, as it has been noted in the ICSID case Mondev International Ltd v. US of 11 October 2002 with particular reference to the FET standard provided in the NAFTA under Article 1105(1) (see infra), “A reasonable evolutionary interpretation (…) is consistent both with the travaux, with normal principles of interpretation and with the fact that (…) the terms “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” had their origin in bilateral treaties in the post-war period. In these circumstances the content of the minimum standard today cannot be limited to the content of customary international law as recognised in arbitral decisions in the 1920s”.

2. **FET in the multilateral instruments, Free Trade Agreements and in BITs**

   a) **Multilateral Instruments**

   The first reference to the FET is found in Article 11, para. 2 (a)(1) of the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organisation, assessing that
foreign investments should be assured “just and equitable treatment”. As a specific investment protection standard, it appeared in the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Foreign Investment (Article I), and in the 1967 Draft Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property (the OECD Convention) (Article 1 (a)).

The FET clause is included in the 1985 Convention establishing the MIGA (Article 12 (d)), establishing that “In guaranteeing an investment, the Agency shall satisfy itself as to: (...) the investment conditions in the host country, including the availability of fair and equitable treatment and legal protection for the investment”.

The Section III of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment also provides that “2. Each State will extend to investments established in its territory by nationals of any other State fair and equitable treatment according to the standards recommended in these Guidelines”.

Article 10 of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty provides that “(l) Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment”.

The standard of FET was also included in the 1998 Draft MAI, in Section IV, Investment Protection, Article 1.1: “Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of another Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security”.

At the regional level, the FET standard was accepted by the ACP Contracting States in the 1989 Lomé Convention IV, as revised successively, which provided under Article 110 (1), iv) that “private foreign investors complying with the objectives and priorities of ACP-EC development cooperation should be encouraged to participate in the development efforts of the ACP States. Fair and equitable treatment should be accorded to such investment as well as a propitious, secure and predictable investment climate” and under Article 258, b) also stated that “The ACP States and the Community, recognizing the importance of private investment in the promotion of their development co-operation and acknowledging the need to take steps to promote such investment, shall (b) accord fair and equitable treatment to such investors”.

Article 1105 (1) of the NAFTA requires the State parties to “accord investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment”.

The Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development which was finalized in 2005 and intended as a basis for bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations and agreements, combines FET with the minimum standard of treatment. Article 7, (A) (Minimum international standards) provides that “Each Party shall accord to investors or their investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”, specifying under para. B that “Paragraph (A) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” are included within this standard, and do not create additional substantive rights”.

More recently, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement signed in Cha-am, Thailand, in 2009, includes a rather wide provision concerning the FET, requesting the Contracting States to guarantee that “1. Each Member State shall accord to covered investments of investors of any other Member State, fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 2. For greater certainty: (a) fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny justice in any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process; and (b) full protection and security requires each Member State to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of the covered investments”.

b) Bilateral Instruments

At the bilateral level, the practice of including the FET standard as a safeguard clause for foreign investors was initially diffused in the US treaties on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN), simply providing for “equitable treatment” or using the more complete wording “fair and equitable treatment”.

Also in the US BITs, the FET clause is generally linked to international law. This connection is particularly clear in the US Model BIT, which provides that (Article 5, n.1): “Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”. This provision further clarifies that (n. 2) “For greater certainty, paragraph 1 prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to covered investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and
security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by that standard, and do not create additional substantive rights”.

Among the number of US BITs, it can be mentioned the US-Argentina BIT, which under Article II provides that: “2. a) Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less than that required by international law”.

The 2004 Japan-United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, in relation to the general treatment accorded to investments, provides that (Article 60) “Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of the other Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”.

A further variation in the link to international law as a standard for the FET in the relation between contracting States in a BIT implies the reference to customary international law. This is the case of the above mentioned 2007 Colombia Model BIT, as well as the 2005 US-Uruguay BIT (Article 5, para.1: “Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”).

Article 5 of 2007 Norway Model BIT provides that “Each Party shall accord to investors of the other Party, and their investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”.

Colombia Model BIT of 2007 requires the contracting parties to accept that (Article III (3)) “Each Party shall accord fair and equitable treatment in accordance with customary international law, and full protection and security in its territory to investments of investors of the other Contracting Party”, specifying that (Article III (4)) “For greater certainty, a. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and "full protection and security" do not require additional treatment to that required under the minimum standard of treatment of aliens in accordance with the standard of customary international law. (...) c. "Fair and equitable treatment" includes the prohibition against denial of justice in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the main legal systems of the world”.

The German Model BIT introduced in 2008 among the general provisions concerning the admission and protection of investments states that (Article 2 (2)): “Each Contracting State shall in its territory in every case accord
investments by investors of the other Contracting State fair and equitable treatment as well as full protection under this Treaty”.

Article 5 of 2004 Canada Model BIT provides that “1. Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. 2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and "full protection and security" in paragraph 1 do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens”.

Similarly the 2006 Canada-Peru BIT (Article 5, para. 1) specifies that (Article 5, para 2) “The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" in paragraph 1 do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens”.

3. Different languages of the FET Clauses

The practice of bilateral treaties has evidenced different approaches to dealing with the FET standard. In its 2008 Report concerning the investment agreements in the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Region, UNCTAD emphasizes the different drafting of the FET clauses depending on the existence of a link between the wording “fair and equitable treatment” and a more general reference to “treatment under international law”.

It has been noted that some treaties (only a few BITs, however) simply do not include any FET standard. This has important consequences for the investor who will have a reduced protection against unfair measures possibly adopted by the host State and will only claim for the violation of the minimum standard of treatment as prescribed by customary international law for the aliens (cf. BRONFMAN, Fair and Equitable Treatment: an Evolving Standard, 2006, p. 624 ff.).

Some BITs do not contain any reference to international law, simply providing that each contracting party shall accord to investments of the other contracting party “a fair and equitable treatment”. See among others the 2004 BIT between India and Indonesia (Article 3); 1996 UK-Ecuador BIT (Article 2, para.2) “Investments of nationals or companies of each Contracting Party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection and security (…)”. A slight variation (but rare) of this type of clause is when the BIT simply refers to “equitable” treatment, without mentioning the “fairness” of the treatment. See Article 2 of the 2002 Lebanon-Malaysia BIT and Article III of the 1991 Indonesia-Norway BIT (“equitable and reasonable”).
The NAFTA FET clause inserted in Article 1105 (quoted above) is an example of a clear connection between the principle of FET and international law, when requiring the Contracting Parties to grant “treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment”. In the interpretation given in the NAFTA system it has been noted that this does not mean that investments should be given treatment beyond what is required under international law minimum standard of treatment (cf. UNCTAD Report 2008). It is significant that the Canadian Statement on Implementation of NAFTA states that Article 1105(1) “provides for a minimum absolute standard of treatment, based on longstanding principles of customary international law” (cf. Canada, Department of External Affairs, North American Free Trade Agreement, Canadian Statement on Implementation, Canada Gazette, 1 January 1994). See also the FET clause contained in Article 7, (A) of the 2005 Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, both mentioned above.

The FET as provided for in the NAFTA was attentively examined in the ICSID case Mondev v. US. More recently it has been analyzed by two arbitral tribunals, reaching different conclusions. In the ICSID case Glamis Gold v. United States, Award of 8 June 2009, the Arbitral Tribunal was involved with the interpretation of FET as provided in Article 1105 NAFTA. The Tribunal stated that (para. 615) “[t]he customary international law minimum standard of treatment is just that, a minimum standard. It is meant to serve as a floor, an absolute bottom, below which conduct is not accepted by the international community. Although the circumstances of the case are of course relevant, the standard is not meant to vary from state to state or investor to investor”. The Tribunal moreover affirmed that “The fair and equitable treatment promised by Article 1105 is not dynamic; it cannot vary between nations as thus the protection afforded would have no minimum”. Then the Tribunal in order to identify possible parameters for the FET standard made reference to the decision in the 1926 Neer case (Neer v. Mexico, 4 R. Int’l Arb. Awards, 1926)(para. 616): “The fundamentals of the Neer standard thus still apply today: to violate the customary international law minimum standard of treatment codified in article 1105 of the NAFTA, an act must be sufficiently egregious and shocking – a gross denial of justice, manifest arbitrariness, blatant unfairness, a complete lack of due process, evident discrimination, or a manifest lack of reasons – so as to fall below accepted international standards and constitute a breach of article 1105(1). The Tribunal notes that one aspect of evolution from Neer that is generally agreed upon is that bad faith is not required to find a violation of the fair and equitable treatment standard, but its presence is conclusive evidence of such. Thus, an act that is egregious or shocking may also
evidence bad faith, but such bad faith is not necessary for the finding of a violation. The standard for finding a breach of the customary international law minimum standard of treatment therefore remains as stringent as it was under Neer; it is entirely possible, however that, as an international community, we may be shocked by State actions now that did not offend us previously”.

In the NAFTA case Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada, Award of 31 March 2010, the Tribunal was also called to determine the meaning of the FET clause contained in Article 1105 NAFTA in relation to the minimum standard granted by international law. In this perspective the Neer case was again quoted, although in a more critical manner (paras. 201 and 209): “The approach of the Neer Commission and of other tribunals which dealt with due process may best be described as the first track of the evolution of the so called minimum standard of treatment. In fact, as international law matured and began to focus on the rights of individuals, the minimum standard became a part of the international law of human rights, applicable to aliens and nationals alike. (…) State practice with respect to the standard for the treatment of aliens in relation to business, trade and investments, while varied and sometimes erratic, has shown greater consistency than in respect of the first track, as it has generally endorsed an open and non-restricted approach to the applicable standard to the treatment of aliens under international law. At the same time it shows that the restrictive Neer standard has not been endorsed or has been much qualified. The parties have extensively discussed whether the customary law standard might have converged with the fair and equitable treatment standard, but convergence is not really the issue. The situation is rather one in which the customary law standard has led to and resulted in establishing the fair and equitable treatment standard as different stages of the same evolutionary process”. In its conclusion on the issue the Tribunal observed that (para. 213): “The applicable minimum standard of treatment of investors is found in customary international law and that, except for cases of safety and due process, broader than that defined in the Neer case and its progeny. Specifically this standard provides for the fair and equitable treatment of alien investors within the confines of reasonableness. The protection does not go beyond that required by customary law, as the FTC has emphasized. Nor, however, should protected treatment fall short of the customary law standard”.

4. The core elements of the FET standard according to the arbitral case-law

Although considering all the differences in the drafting of the FET clause in BITs, arbitral tribunals have often gone beyond the discussion whether FET corresponds to the minimum standard protection granted by international
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law, and have identified some core elements distinguishable in the FET standard. These elements are hereby indicated with reference to the most recent arbitral practice.

a) Due process/denial of justice

The violation of this basic principle of law determines an international wrongful act of denial of justice. The denial of justice can be interpreted on the basis of customary international law. The breach of such obligation might be attributed to the host State judiciary or even to the executive. This requirement is considered to be so fundamental that in the practice of US BIT and FTA is specifically indicated. See 2004 US Model BIT, Article 5, para. 2 (a) which provides “‘fair and equitable treatment’ includes the obligation not to deny justice in criminal, civil, or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal legal systems of the world”.

The due process principle has been coped with in various ICSID cases. Among them, the standard by which a denial of justice should be affirmed was widely evaluated in the case Mondev International Ltd v. USA (2002). In that case the issue of the “denial of justice” was examined with reference to NAFTA Article 1105 (1). The Tribunal observed: “(...) in applying the international minimum standard, it is vital to distinguish the different factual and legal contexts presented for decision. It is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary and another to second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest courts of a State. Under NAFTA, parties have the option to seek local remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits, it is not the function of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal”. The Tribunal recalled a previous NAFTA case, Azinian v. United Mexican States (1999), where it was affirmed that: “The possibility of holding a State internationally liable for judicial decisions does not, however, entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court decisions as though the international jurisdiction seised has plenary appellate jurisdiction. This is not true generally, and it is not true for NAFTA”. In the Azinian case the Tribunal also held that: “A denial of justice could be pleaded if the relevant courts refuse to entertain a suit, if they subject it to undue delay, or if they administer justice in a seriously inadequate way... There is a fourth type of denial of justice, namely the clear and malicious misapplication of the law. This type of wrong doubtless overlaps with the notion of ‘pretence of form’ to mask a violation of international law”. The qualification of a “due process violation” also reminds of the ICJ judgement Elettronica Sicula (ELSI) case (United States v. Italy, 20 July 1989), when a Chamber of the Court considered as an arbitrary conduct “a wilful disregard...
of due process of law, (...) which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”.

In the same Mondev case, the Tribunal was requested to consider whether to confer immunity from suit on a public authority of a State in respect of wrongful conduct affecting an investment can be considered “denial of justice” and consequently a failure to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investment, thus contravening Article 1105(1). In this respect the Tribunal was called to consider also the international case-law on immunities of public authorities, including the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The Tribunal stated that: “These decisions concern the “right to a court”, an aspect of the human rights conferred on all persons by the major human rights conventions and interpreted by the European Court in an evolutionary way. They emanate from a different region, and are not concerned, as Article 1105(1) of NAFTA is concerned, specifically with investment protection. At most, they provide guidance by analogy as to the possible scope of NAFTA’s guarantee of “treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”. But the Tribunal would observe that, as soon as it was decided that (...) was covered by the statutory immunity (a matter for Massachusetts law), then the existence of the immunity was arguably to be classified as a matter of substance rather than procedure in terms of the distinction under Article 6(1) of the European Convention”.

More recently, the issue of the due process was raised in the ICSID case Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi v. Pakistan, Award of 27 August 2009. The Tribunal stated that it agreed “with Bayindir when it identifies the different factors which emerge from decisions of investment tribunals as forming part of the FET standard. These comprise the obligation to act transparently and grant due process” (para. 178).

In the ICSID case Toto Costruzioni v. Lebanon, Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 September 2009, the Tribunal denied its jurisdiction over the investor’s claim of delays in two lawsuits before the Conseil d’Etat as breach of the fair and equitable standard provision in the Italy–Lebanon BIT as the claimant had not satisfied a prima facie case. The Arbitral Tribunal affirmed that (para. 164): “Moreover, a state can only be held liable for denial of justice when it has not remedied this denial domestically. As summarized by Jan Paulsson: ‘States are held to an obligation to provide a fair and efficient system of justice, not to an undertaking that there will never be an instance of judicial misconduct. National responsibility for denial of justice occurs only when the system as a whole has been tested and the initial delict has remained uncorrected... The very definition of denial of justice encompasses the notion of exhaustion of local remedies. There can be no denial of justice
"before exhaustion" (the Tribunal quoted PAULSSON, Denial of justice in International Law, 2007, p. 245-246).

In the recent ICSID case *GEA v. Ukraine*, Award of 31 March 2011, the breach of the obligation to Fair and Equitable Treatment, invoked in relation to due process, was examined as applied to the refusal of Ukrainian courts to recognise and enforce an ICC Award.

b) Non-discrimination and arbitrariness

The principle of due process is strictly connected with the obligation of non discrimination and arbitrariness.

The principle of non discrimination/arbitrariness was affirmed by the ICJ in the *ELSI* case: “Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law. This idea was expressed by the Court in the Asylum case, when it spoke of "arbitrary action" being "substituted for the rule of law" (Asylum, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1950, p. 284). It is a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety” (para. 128).

In the ICSID case *Lemire v. Ukraine*, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 2010 (para. 261), the Tribunal affirmed that “Discrimination, in the words of pertinent precedents, requires more than different treatment. To amount to discrimination, a case must be treated differently from similar cases without justification; a measure must be “discriminatory and expose[s] the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice”; or a measure must “target[ed] Claimant’s investments specifically as foreign investments”.

As to arbitrariness, in the same case *Lemire v. Ukraine*, the Tribunal confirmed that (para. 262) arbitrariness has been described as “founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact”; “...contrary to the law because...[it] shocks, or at least surprises, a sense of juridical propriety”; or “wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises a sense of judicial propriety”; or conduct which “manifestly violate[s] the requirements of consistency, transparency, even-handedness and non-discrimination”. The Tribunal also made reference to the definition of “arbitrary” measure given by Schreuer (who acted as expert in the ICSID Case *EDF (Services) Limited v. Romania*, Award of 8 October 2009, and was quoted by the Tribunal at para. 303 of the Award): “a. a measure that inflicts damage on the investor without serving any apparent legitimate purpose; b. a measure that is not based on legal standards but on discretion, prejudice or personal preference; c. a measure taken for reasons that are different from those put forward by the decision maker; d. a measure taken in wilful disregard of due process and proper procedure.”

The Tribunal then affirmed that (para. 263): “Summing up, the underlying
notion of arbitrariness is that prejudice, preference or bias is substituted for the rule of law”.

d) Due diligence

This obligation is also known as “obligation of vigilance”. It has been analyzed in some arbitral disputes, but often in connection to the principles of standard of full protection and security (cf. also the Full Protection and Security standard, infra).

e) Legitimate expectations: transparency, consistent conduct

These basic requirements for the investor’s operation in the host State are strictly connected. Transparency should guarantee that the legal framework for the investment in the host State is stable and predictable to the investor and any measures undertaken by the host State can be reconnected to the legal order that was opened to the investor. As it has been noted, this legal framework “consist[s] of legislation and treaties, of assurances contained in decrees, licences and similar executive assurances as well as in contractual undertakings (...).” Under this issue the FET standard implies the protection of the investor’s right to plan and establish the investment, having duly examined the law order of the host State (DOLZER, SCHREUER, 2008). The 1998 Draft MAI included in its Section III a complete provision focused on transparency, stating that “Each Contracting Party shall promptly publish, or otherwise make publicly available, its laws, regulations, procedures and administrative rulings and judicial decisions of general application as well as international agreements which may affect the operation of the Agreement”. Problems might also arise due to inconsistent positions taken by the State, such as the reversal of assurances.

In the case GAMI v. Mexico, NAFTA–UNCITRAL Award of 15 November 2004, on the interpretation of Article 1105, the Arbitral Tribunal stated (paras. 92 ff): “The challenging task for this Tribunal is to apply these abstractions. It is necessary first to enquire how they relate to compliance with national law. 93. To repeat: NAFTA arbitrators have no mandate to evaluate laws and regulations that predate the decision of a foreigner to invest”. Other precedent NAFTA disputes are Metalclad v. United Mexican States, ICSID Award of 30 August 2000, Waste Management v. United Mexican States, ICSID Award of 30 April 2004.

The issue of transparency has been afforded in various ICSID cases, among others the most recent cases are: Plama, Award (12 November 2008, Siag & Vecchi, Award of 1 June 2009; Lemire v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, 14 January 2010. In the latter case, the Tribunal observed (para. 284) “The FET standard defined in the BIT is an autonomous treaty standard, whose precise meaning must be established on a case-by-case
basis. It requires an action or omission by the State which violates a certain threshold of propriety, causing harm to the investor, and with a causal link between action or omission and harm. The threshold must be defined by the Tribunal, on the basis of the wording of Article II.3 of the BIT, and bearing in mind a number of factors, including among others the following: - whether the State has failed to offer a stable and predictable legal framework; (...) - whether there is an absence of transparency in the legal procedure or in the actions of the State”.

f) Good faith

This element of the FET standard is commonly recognised as a general principle of law, requiring the parties to act honestly and fairly with each other. In the ICSID case Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, Award and Dissenting opinion of 1 June 2009, the Tribunal affirmed (para. 450): “The general, if not cardinal, principle of customary international law that States must act in good faith is thus a useful yardstick by which to measure the Fair and Equitable standard”.

Similarly, in the ICSID case Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Kazakhstan, Award of 29 July 2008 (confirmed by the Ad Hoc Committee with Decision of 25 March 2010) the Tribunal affirmed that: “The parties rightly agree that the fair and equitable treatment standard encompasses inter alia the following concrete principles: (...) - the State is obliged to act in good faith”.

5. The Full Protection and Security Standard

Considering the various questions connected with the FET clause, it is worth mentioning the Full Protection and Security clauses. This standard of protection has often been absorbed by the FET. In fact in the practice of the investment agreements, the obligation of the contracting States to accord full protection and security, in its various languages, often appears in addition and/or as an integration of the FET standard.

In connection with the FET clause, Article 10, para. 1 of the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty also provides that not only each Contracting Party will encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of the other Contracting Parties, including a commitment to accord fair and equitable treatment, but also “[s]uch Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal”.

Still in connection with the FET clause, the 1998 Draft MAI in Section IV, Investment Protection, Article 1.1 provided that: “Each Contracting Party
shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of another Contracting Party (…) full and constant protection and security”.

Under its Article 1105 (1) the NAFTA agreement requires the contracting States to “accord investments of investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including (…) full protection and security”.

Similarly the 2005 IISD Model Agreement combines FET and Full Protection and Security standards with the minimum standard of treatment. Article 7, (A) (Minimum international standards) provides that “Each Party shall accord to investors or their investments treatment in accordance with customary international law, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”, specifying under para. B that “Paragraph (A) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” are included within this standard, and do not create additional substantive rights”.

The recent ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), entered into force on 1 January 2010, provides for a detailed set of provisions concerning investment protection. In particular its Article 6 (Treatment of Investment) connects the standard to customary international law and provides that (para. 1) “Each Party shall accord to covered investments fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security”.

Under para. 2 the AANZFTA clarifies that “For greater certainty: (…) full protection and security requires each Party to take such measures as may be reasonably necessary to ensure the protection and security of the covered investment; and the concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required under customary international law, and do not create additional substantive rights”. Moreover, in view of possible violations of these standards of treatment of investments, para. 3 states that “A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of this Agreement, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of this Article”.

Most BITs contain a clause providing that the contracting States will grant FET standard and accord the full protection and security to investors. The provision was also contained in a number of US Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties. Among others the Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty between United States and Italy states under Article V (1) that “The nationals of each High Contracting Party shall receive, within the territories of the other High Contracting Party, the most constant protection
and security for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect the full protection and security required by international law”.

The Full Protection and Security provision can be differently drafted, generally in respect of the context. The arbitral practice, however, does not seem to attach a decisive importance to the wording of the clause in order to determine the exact scope of the clause. As generally agreed, the standard of Full Protection and Security is to be interpreted as aiming at securing the physical safety of the assets, installation and individuals connected to a foreign investment. The obligation of a State to ensure Full Protection and Security implies the obligation to preserve public order and safety of the investment adopting measures i) to prevent harmful events, ii) to restore a security condition as it was before the harmful events, and iii) to impose sanctions preventing the occurrence of damages. In this respect, cf. among others the ICSID cases Wena Hotels Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award of 8 December 2000; PSEG Global et al. v. Republic of Turkey, Award of 19 January 2007; The Channel Tunnel Group Ltd, France-Manche SA v. United Kingdom and the Republic of France, Partial Award of 30 January 2007.

Despite the limited relevance of the standard in investment arbitration, an issue that remains unsolved is whether or not Full Protection and Security is to be considered absorbed in the protection granted by the FET. This issue has been examined in various cases. In the case Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador, (LCIA case) Final Award of 1st July 2004, the Tribunal observed that “the Respondent has breached its obligations to accord fair and equitable treatment under Article II (3) (a) of the Treaty [US-Ecuador BIT]. In the context of finding the question of whether in addition there has been a breach of full protection and security under this Article becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically entails an absence of full protection and security of the investment” (para. 187).

In the Azurix v. Argentine Republic, Award of 14 July 2006, the Tribunal stated that it was “persuaded of the interrelationship of fair and equitable treatment and the obligation to afford the investor full protection and security. The cases referred to above [cf. Occidental case] show that full protection and security was understood to go beyond protection and security ensured by the police. It is not only a matter of physical security; the stability afforded by a secure investment environment is as important from an investor’s point of view. The Tribunal is aware that in recent free trade agreements signed by the United States, for instance, with Uruguay, full protection and security is understood to be limited to the level of police protection required under customary international law. However, when the terms “protection and security” are qualified by “full” and no other
adjective or explanation, they extend, in their ordinary meaning, the content of this standard beyond physical security. To conclude, the Tribunal, having held that the Respondent failed to provide fair and equitable treatment to the investment, finds that the Respondent also breached the standard of full protection and security under the BIT”. In this case the BIT concerned was between US and Argentine.

6. Questions related to the interpretation and application of FET

− What is the relationship between FET and customary international law minimum standard?
− Whenever the FET clause in a BIT is not expressly linked to the minimum standard of international law, is it possible to determine its meaning going beyond the limits of the minimum standard in similar cases?
− How should the measure of compensation of investors be determined in case of violation of the FET standard?

7. Basic references

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IV. The Impact of the European Union on International Investment Law and Arbitration (Issue L on the General Outline)

1. Introduction

This subject has recently become extremely important after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, explicitly conferring competence to the European Union in the matter of foreign direct investments.

The traditional impact of European law on international investment arbitration was mainly exercised through the selection mechanisms of the applicable law to investment disputes. The European law being a source of law that an arbitration tribunal may be called to apply directly or indirectly, as incorporated in a national law that the tribunal has to apply. In this regard, two non-ICSID arbitral decisions, one in 2007 and the other in 2010, addressed the matter of application by new EU Member States of BITs stipulated with Member States, prior to their admission to the Union.

The new recent impact of the EU on the International investment law is twofold.

First, it is due to three judgments of the European Court of Justice in 2009 and 2010, condemning three European States for not having denounced or freed themselves from the BITs with third countries which contain engagements that are or may result to be in contradiction with European law.

Second, it is due to the effects of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, which extends to direct investments the exclusive competence of the EU in matters of commercial policy. This will cause the presence in the international investment world of a new actor, the EU, that, from its starting attitude and behaviour, seems to be willing to assume an active and somehow innovating role in the world of international investment law and arbitration.

2. European law applicable in Investment Arbitration

a) In ICSID arbitration

An analysis of traditional methods and solutions applicable law must start, nowadays, with the ICSID system, which was the system within the context of which classic solutions were consolidated and the most significant developments occurred.

Indeed, in the framework of bilateral treaties for the protection of investments (BIT) the ICSID arbitration plays a dominant role. It therefore appears opportune to focus this examination on the latter (see in this regard MAURO, Gli accordi bilateral, 2003, esp. p. 321 ff.; MC LACHLAN, SHORE, WEINIGER, International Investment Arbitration, 2007, esp. p. 45 ff.).
Obviously, when the ICSID mechanism is preferred, courts must apply the rules of the Washington Convention, especially the provision in Article 42 (1) on the applicable law. In the specific context of opting for ICSID arbitration which is based on a BIT, it is quite evident that also the BIT substantial and procedural rules must be applied in principle.

It is to be noted that this conclusion is clearly expressed, as in the Italo-Argentinian BIT of May 25, 1990 in Article 8 (7) which states: “The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide on the basis of the law of the Contracting Party to the dispute – including the precepts of the latter that apply to conflicts of laws –, of the provisions of this Agreement, of clauses in any special agreements regarding investment, and on the basis of international principles of law that are applicable to the subject matter.

Another example is the BIT between Holland and the Czechoslovak Republic of 29 April 1991, which was applied in the arbitration award of 26 October 2010 discussed, infra, Subsection B. Article 8 (6) of this Treaty states: “The arbitral tribunal shall decide on the basis of the law, taking into account in particular though not exclusively: the law in force in the Contracting Party concerned; the provisions of this Agreement, and other relevant Agreements between the Contracting Parties; the provisions of special agreements relating to the investment; the general principles of international law.”.

Furthermore the Washington Convention rules must be applied in order to obtain an arbitration award that complies with the _ratione personae_ and _ratione materiae_ requirements of the Washington Convention and with the specifications, effects and control mechanisms inherent to ICSID arbitration. This will occur, furthermore, subject to the limit of the conflict between the BIT provisions and binding international rules, both general and specific (_jus cogens_) which must always be applied.

The core element of this analysis is thus surely Article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention. As is widely known, the provision covers two different cases: when there is an agreement between the parties on the matter, and when an agreement is lacking. In the first case the court shall decide in accordance “with such rules of law as may be agreed by the parties”. In this regard commentators and ICSID arbitration practice appears to agree in stressing that adopting the expression “rules of law”, instead of the traditional “law”, also allows parties to choose non-state rules, such as general principles and _lex mercatoria_ rules. Naturally the decision to choose the applicable rules state law may also be employed to govern just a portion of an investment agreement. In this regard, it must be ascertained to what extent subjecting an agreement or a portion thereof to state or non-national rules is compatible with other rules of law which would otherwise be
applicable, whether they are state, international or, nowadays, even rules of law of the European Union.

It is equally widely-known that, in cases where the parties do not select the applicable rules of law, an ICSID Tribunal court shall apply “the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict of laws)”. In the context of this legal and political debate some considerations appear especially useful.

The first consideration concerns the explicit indication, among the host state rules to be applied, of the conflicts of laws rules. This is a special option that is usually excluded from national legal systems and international covenants on private international law. Said systems, while allowing considerable latitude of choice, total or partial, of a foreign law by parties to an agreement, do not also include reference to conflict of law systems because such conflict rules could in turn lead to applying material rules differing from those chosen by the parties as applicable to their agreement. The reference, in Article 42 (1), to conflict of law rules of the State hosting an investment appears to carry considerable weight, inasmuch as it is a global reference to the host state’s legal system, including all the rules which apply to the case under consideration, or can apply even though they may originate from different legal systems.

It is certain that the provision refers to traditional conflict rules intended the application of laws other than the law of the State hosting the investment in order to regulate certain matters which need to be regulated by the law of different States which have a better or a preferable “legislative competence”. It is also certain that said provision is indicative of an overall fair and correct legal system in the host state, which is alive and open. It can therefore include, as well as the rules of a foreign juridical system that may be taken as reference, applicable international law as well, both conventional or customary. Especially important in this context are the primary and secondary European legislation regulating investments in EU Member States.

The second consideration refers to international law as in Article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention. To start with, it should be noted that there is a marked difference between the French version on one hand, and the English and Spanish versions on the other. The former refers solely to “principles of international law” whereas the other two refer more extensively to all the “rules of international law”, including treaty law and therefore, bilateral treaties on the protection of investments possibly in force between the two States involved. The difference could be clear-cut and fraught with consequences, but in practice it is not considered important by commentators and ICSID awards, which appear to agree that both general principles of
international law and special treaty law must be observed and applied by ICSID Tribunals.

The further clarification concerns the role that international law (treaty and/or customary law) plays with respect to a host State’s domestic legal system, and which remains however still applicable in principle. From the early jurisprudence of ICSID tribunals, and with the agreement of the majority of commentators, two functions have been attributed to international law on the basis of the reference contained in Article 42 (1); one to fill any gaps in the applicable state law and one to “correct” state law in the event that it conflicts with international law. Jurisprudence of ICSID tribunals and the related doctrine are so well-known that it would be superfluous or too incomplete to refer to them.

However two observations are necessary. The first is that the “corrective” function does not imply, obviously, any corrections to applicable State law in a technical or literal sense, but simply substantial non-application of it by an ICSID tribunal in a specific case when, in principle, it would be under obligation to apply said State law. Consequently, in that case, the provisions of the state law in question would be replaced by international law, both conventional rules and customary rules that to be reference is made by Article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention.

The second observation refers to the fact that non-application of the state law which conflicts with international law cannot necessarily imply its total replacement with international law every time it appears that the state law in question contains a provision that is or might be in conflict with international law. For example, the attitude adopted by the Tribunal in the ICSID case Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Helena v. Costa Rica issued on 17 February 2000 does not seem acceptable (cf. GIARDINA, Diritto internazionale e diritto interno in tema di espropriazioni, Rivista dell’arbitrato, 2001, p. 120 ff.)

A decision was taken to settle the entire dispute exclusively on the basis of international law after having ascertained that an agreement existed between the parties that in the event of a conflict between domestic law and international law, the latter would prevail. With this in mind the Tribunal opted for identifying and applying international standards of reference totally ignoring the applicable domestic law.

On the basis of the aforementioned premises, so as to definitively formulate and assess the application of European law (current and future) in the context of the application of international law of investment in Europe, there are two alternatives to take into consideration.
The first possibility is to consider that European law and the laws of Member States, although differing from one another, substantially constitute an integrated whole in the context of which, furthermore, European law prevails over conflicting State laws. The latter, as is well known, and according to jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and national tribunals, should be directly disregarded by domestic judges so as to ensure the prevalence of EU law. In this respect EU law should be seen as an integrating, superordinated part of domestic regulations of all Member States, and as especially enforceable so as to override common state regulations. The result would be that when the law of a EU Member State should be applied pursuant to Article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention, the EU law (and especially the law regulating foreign investment) would be directly applicable. It should not be forgotten, however, that also as regards European law – as an integrated, superordinated part of Member State’s regulations – this is without prejudice to the provision contained in the last sentence of Article 42 (1), which requires adherence to international law in any case, whether it is treaty law or customary law, according to the above-described procedures and extent.

The second possibility is to consider EU law a sort, although unusual, of international treaty law, taken into consideration and protected because of the final sentence in Article 42 (1). In this way EU law would be protected by "filling in the gaps" and “correcting” State law that is incompatible with it. Also in this way, therefore, EU law, in its nature of international treaty law, would be protected and applied, but always in accordance with the principles and rules of general international law concerning compatibility between conventions and international treaty law and international customary law.

The choice between these two alternatives cannot be made exclusively on the basis of technical-juridical criteria. Other criteria may be taken into consideration, particularly of a political and economic type. For example, the first criteria, of a domestic type, might be preferred by EU institutions because it stresses and further favours the supremacy of EU law over the laws of Member States from a federal viewpoint. The second criteria, of a basically international type, might be preferred by States and those who feel they must stress and further favour the autonomy of single States in abidance with and the conduct of their international relations with third countries.

It must however be kept in mind that, at this point in time, both criteria would appear to adequately ensure both the full application of EU law to foreign investments, and current compliance with international law, both treaty and customary law, to the extent to which it has to be applied according to Article 42 (1) of the Washington Convention.
b) In non-ICSID arbitration

Two non-ICSID arbitral awards that compared some principles of European law with the BITs seem particularly relevant.

In the Eastern Sugar v. Czech Republic case of 27 March 2007, decided according to the Arbitration Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, the investing company maintained that the Czech Republic had breached its rights under the 1991 BIT between the Czech Republic and the Netherlands, because of an alleged discriminatory application of the EU agricultural policy to the company.


The Czech Republic asserted that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the BIT was terminated in 1991 due to the Republic having joined the European Union. Especially because the BIT and EU law concern the same matters, the latter, being posterior, should prevail according to the relevant principles of international law, as incorporated in Article 59 of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties.

The Arbitral Tribunal firstly noted that the contents of the BIT and of applicable EU Law were not completely identical (for a critical examination of this point of the arbitration award, see POUILAIN, Quelques interrogations sur le statut des Traités bilatéraux de promotion et de protection des investissements au sein de l’Union Européenne, Revue générale de droit international public, 2007, p. 803 ff., esp. p. 811 ff. and TEYNIER, L’applicabilité des traités bilatéraux sur les investissements entre Etats membres de l’Union européenne, Cahiers de l’Arbitrage 2008/1, p. 12 ff, spec. p. 14 ff.)

It also noted that the dispute had arisen before the Czech Republic was admitted to the European Union, and therefore the arbitral clause continued to be valid and effective. Consequently the Tribunal declared it had jurisdiction and continued the proceedings as to the merit of the dispute.

A second non-ICSID arbitral award that should be mentioned here is the one issued on 26 October 2010 in the Eureko v. Slovak Republic case. It was a Partial Award issued after a proceeding conducted according to UNCITRAL rules on the basis of the 1991 BIT concluded between the Netherlands and the Czech Republic. The award, which addressed only the questions of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, the arbitrability of the case and the suspension of the proceeding, performed an in-depth examination of the problems here examined. The Dutch company Eureko alleged, pursuant to the 1991 BIT,
that its participation in two Slovakian companies operating in the field of insurance had been harmed, especially in the health sector. Eureko had acquired its stake and interests in 2004 during a period of comparative liberalization of the Slovakian National Health Service. Subsequently the public law system was changed in the period 2006 – 2009, which according to Eureko led to forms of indirect expropriation, treatment that was not fair and equitable, and impediments to the free transfer of profits and dividends, all of which in breach of the BIT.

The Slovakian Republic preliminarily raised an “Intra-EU Jurisdictional Objection” to oppose the application of the BIT in this case, maintaining its non-applicability following the Republic’s accession to the Community. The non-applicability of the BIT or its termination were based on i) considerations of general international law (Articles 59 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties); ii) considerations pertaining to EU law which is part of Slovakian law being applicable under said BIT; and iii) considerations of non-arbitrability according to German law, applicable for the Arbitral Tribunal had its seat in Germany. Given the importance of the objection raised, the Arbitral Tribunal, with the parties’ agreement, asked Dutch government and the European Commission to submit their comments, taking into account the comments that the Commission had submitted in the Eastern Sugar case in 2007.

The Tribunal first of all noted that its competence is based on the 1991 BIT (in particular, on Article 8) which must be interpreted and applied in accordance with international law. Furthermore, the claimant having opted for UNCITRAL arbitration by virtue of said BIT Article 8, and the seat of the Tribunal having been fixed in Germany, German law is the lex loci arbitri which EU law is undoubtedly part of. In addition, the Tribunal decided that due to the fact that the basis for its competence was the BIT, to be interpreted and applied in accordance with international law, the consequences of the application of international law should be assessed and applied “within the framework of the rules of international law and not in disregard of those rules” (Eureko Award para. 281).

The Tribunal therefore examined and rejected the justification for termination of the BIT pursuant to Article 59 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, because the parties had subsequently entered into an incompatible agreement “relating to the same subject matter” upon the Republic’s entry in the EU. Subsequently the Court declared the contention based on Article 30 of the Vienna Convention inapplicable in this case, according to which a first treaty followed by a second treaty between the same parties can only be applied to the extent to which it is compatible with the second treaty. But such incompatibility could not matter when verifying
the Tribunal’s competence, which is based on Article 8 of the BIT, but it
could be relevant when issuing the award on the merits which would
certainly take EU law into consideration (ibidem, nos. 268-273).
Lastly the Tribunal, reiterating that it has been constituted according to a
provision contained in a BIT, concluded that, “Far from being precluded
from considering and applying EU law the Tribunal is bound to apply it to
the extent that it is part of the law(s) whether under BIT Article 8, German
law or otherwise” (ibidem. no. 281) and that “The fact that, at the merits
stage, the Tribunal might have to consider and apply provisions of EU law
does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction” (ibidem. no. 283).
The approach taken in these awards appears correct, especially for the issue
that the two Tribunals had to decide first, namely the basis of their
competence.

3. The EU Court of Justice and the effects of European law on BITs
between member States and third States

The problem of compatibility with EU law for bilateral agreements on
investment protection concluded between Member States and third countries
emerged clearly at the time of the two parallel cases brought by the
Commission of European Communities, one against Austria (Case C-
205/06) and the other against Sweden (Case C-249/06), which led to two
parallel decisions of the EU Court of Justice, both issued on 3 March 2009
(for these two judgments of the EU Court and the other one against Finland,
see MAURO, Accordi Internazionali sugli investimenti e Unione Europea,
2010, p. 403 ff).
The Commission took action because Austria and Sweden, prior to the
accession to the EU, entered into a series of bilateral agreements with
various third countries in which they undertook to guarantee that investors in
those countries could freely transfer payments in connection with their
investments. The Commission, finding that this total freedom to transfer
capital could be an hindrance to the restrictions on transfers of capital and
payments possibly adopted by the EU Council pursuant to EC Articles 57,
59 and 60. The Commission in its reasoned opinion, asked the two Member
States to take all necessary steps to eliminate these incompatibilities in
accordance with Article 307, second paragraph CE (now TFEU Article 351).
According to the Commission the two States had provided unsatisfactory
replies to the reasoned opinion, and Austria in particular was not convincing
when stressing that the incompatibility identified had not actually occurred
but was merely hypothetical. Therefore the Commission asked the Court of
Justice to declare the non-compliance of Austria and Sweden with their duty
to take all appropriate steps to eliminate said incompatibilities, as set forth in EC Article 307, second paragraph.

The Court of Justice declared the non-compliance of Austria and Sweden, and accepted the Commission's arguments according to which incompatibility indeed existed between the BITs of the two countries in question and European law, inasmuch as these two countries would certainly not be able to fulfil their EU obligations as properly and rapidly as required. This was due to the fact that the two countries’ BITs did not contain ad hoc safeguard clauses that would have in any case guaranteed application of EU law, as well as the impossibility for the two States to refer to and use other international instruments available to them, such as the denunciation and request to renegotiate the BITs in question, sufficiently quickly and efficiently.

Similarly, with its judgment of 19 November 2009 (Case 118/07) the EU Court of Justice ruled against Finland for failure to comply with its obligations under EC Article 307, second paragraph, with regard to European obligations under EC Articles 57, 59 and 60 and the incompatible provisions of various BITs concluded by Finland with third countries. The Court of Justice specifically rejected the reasoning used by Finland based on the fact that all the disputed BITs, with the exception of the one concluded with the Russian Federation, contain a clause that protects investments “to the extent authorized by the legislation of the Contracting Party” hosting the investment. Consequently – according to Finland, since EU law is an integral part of Finnish law, the disputed BITs cannot provide for different and better treatment for foreign investment than that prescribed for Finnish national investments, which continue to be subject to restrictive measures that may be prescribed by the Council under EC Articles 57, 59 and 60. The Court of Justice was not convinced by this reasoning, affirming that the BITs should be interpreted according to the rules of interpretation laid down by international law as codified by the Vienna Convention of 1969, and it is doubtful that these rules of interpretation can be influenced by the domestic laws of States where they are applied. Furthermore – according to the Court – some of these BITs explicitly state that each contracting party shall act “in accordance with international law”.

This judgement, as well as the previous two, deserve a brief comment. A certain inflexibility can perhaps be discerned in the position taken by the Court against Finland for non fulfilment of EU obligations. The Court strongly defending the autonomous interpretation of BITs according to international law. It denied that the BITs in question might accept to limit and balance the standard of treatment required by the BITs themselves to the standard existing at the domestic level for national investments. It is to be
noted in this regard that this is exactly what all treaties adopting the national treatment standard do legally and effectively.

The most recent judgement of the Court of Justice on this matter is Commission v. Sweden (Case C-246/07) issued on April 20, 2010. The object of the action brought by the Commission against Sweden concerned an alleged breach by Sweden of its duty of loyal cooperation under EC Article 10. The reported breach was caused by the unilateral proposal made by Sweden to include a certain substance (the PFOS) among the pollutants listed in Annex A of the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, to which the Community is also a party. This proposal was put forward at the EC Council while the discussion / negotiation regarding the adoption of a joint approach on the matter was still underway.

The Court of Justice stated (no. 69) that “In all the areas corresponding to the objectives of the Treaty, Article 10 EC requires Member States to facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks and to abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty”. The Court added (no. 71 ff.) that the duty of genuine cooperation is of general applicability and does not depend on whether or not the Community has exclusive competence. In that case competence was shared by the Community and Member States and the Council had for the time being decided not to put forward a joint proposal on inclusion of the PFOS listed in Annex A of the Stockholm Convention. Thus, according to the Court, having unilaterally proposed the inclusion of the substance in question in the Annex A to the Stockholm Convention, Sweden had dissociated itself from the concerted common strategy agreed upon by the Council and, therefore, had failed to fulfill its obligations under EC Article 10.

The overall assessment of the Court of Justice appears to lead to two main conclusions, as follows. On one hand the Court formally asserts the basic premise that previous international agreements of Member States with third countries must be respected and applied, as EU law has always stated, starting with the ECSC Treaty (Article 71) and the EEC Treaty (Article 234) and lastly, in EC Article 307, Paragraph 1, now Article 351, Paragraph 1, TFEU.

On the other hand, however, the Court attributes the maximum importance to provisions (which also existed previously and are now contained in EC Article 307, Paragraph 2, amended to Article 351, Paragraph 2, TFEU) which require States to take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities and, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude and eventually re-negotiate said agreements with third countries on the basis, and it ruled against Member States for non-fulfillment when they failed to re-negotiate or quickly disengage from previous international agreements which are not compatible with the Treaties.
The Court also applied those general principles of European law (such as EC Article 10, presently to TFEU Article 4) which impose a duty of genuine cooperation between Member States and the EU in order to avoid, especially, unilateral acts of the States in international relations that might affect achievement of the EU. The Court accordingly considered unilateral acts of this type undertaken by States as a failure to comply with the duty of genuine collaboration.

4. The impact of the European Union on the development of International Investment Law

Lastly, it seems appropriate to make some comments about the sure impact that the participation of European Union will have on the world of international investments, their promotion, protection and regulation. EU will undoubtedly become one of the most influential and active players. In other words, it seems appropriate to look to the future and try to predict some of the themes and issues pertaining to international investment law on which EU will be called to take a position or might take the initiative itself, both at the level of bilateral treaties or free trade agreements with third-party countries, and in terms of contributing to consolidate and evolve customary international law on the matter.

It only takes a quick glance at the first documents issued by Union institutions, the Commission, the Council and the Parliament, to realize their possible impact on international investment laws.

The following are merely examples of some of the matters which appear especially important.

The first relates to conditions for exercising the right of expropriation by the host country. The first Commission Communication of July 7, 2010 stressed the need to “clearly define the balance of the interests at stake, such as protection of investors against illegal expropriation or the right of each party to regulate in the public interest”. It is also to be pointed out that investment agreements must be compatible with EU and Member States’ policies, including policies on environmental safeguards, labour, health and safety in the workplace, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development and competition. In the Proposal for a Regulation on transitional measures for the BITs concluded by Member States with third countries, the Commission provides for maintaining the applicability of the BITs presently in force, but it is also established that the Commission shall perform a review of the same. This review could lead to withdrawal of the authorization to maintain a BIT in force when, under Article 6.1 (a) and (c) of the Proposal “an agreement conflicts with the law of the Union other than the incompatibilities arising from the allocation of competence between the
Union and its Member States….[or] an agreement constitutes an obstacle to the development and the implementation of the Union’s policies relating to investment, including in particular the common commercial policy”.

Similarly, the European Council, at its session of 25 October 2010, after having recalled the traditional principles of investor protection usually contained in the BITs, also underlined that “the new European international investment policy should be guided by the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action, including the rule of law, human rights and sustainable development as well as taking into account the other policies of the Union and its Member States. The European investment policy must continue to allow the EU and Member States to adopt and enforce measures necessary to pursue public policy objectives” (Section 17).

Lastly, the European Parliament, taking a general approach that aims to provide greater protection for public interests in Europe, has taken a clear position on these issues. In the Parliament Resolution of April 6, 2011, concerning “fair and equitable treatment”, the Preamble stresses under letter G, “the possibility of conflict between private interests and the regulatory tasks of public authorities, for example in cases where the adoption of legitimate legislation led to a state being condemned by international arbitrators for a breach of the principle of «fair and equitable treatment»”. In Section 25 of the Resolution the Commission is requested to include clauses “laying down the right of the parties to the agreement to regulate, inter alia, in the areas of protection of national security, the environment, public health, and workers’ and consumers’ rights” in all future agreements.

Furthermore, the European Parliament, in the aforementioned Resolution, referring to principles on treatment of investments according to what has become a customary framework, takes a strong position on some sectors and asks the Commission “to assess the potential impact of the inclusion of an umbrella-clause in future European investment agreements and to present a report to both the European Parliament and the Council”.

Lastly, the European Parliament, in Section 24 of the Resolution, “Expresses its deep concern regarding the level of discretion of international arbitrators to make a broader interpretation of investor protection clauses, thereby leading to the ruling out of legitimate public regulations; and calls on the Commission to produce clear definitions of investor protection standards in order to avoid such problems in the new investment agreements”.

In conclusion it does appear appropriate to submit that the European Union’s entry onto the world stage as a new player in the field of international investment will lead to important upheavals not only within the EU for the relations between Member States and the EU itself, but also for
the relations with third countries. The EU will thus be able to cause important consequences for the evolution of customary international law in various sensitive areas in the field of investments.

5. Questions related to the impact of the EU on international investment law and arbitration

− Does the exclusive EU competence after the Lisbon Treaty cover also indirect investments?
− Is the notion of public interest according to the EU larger that the traditional notion of public interest according to the law of the member States and/or international law?
− Which are the possible solutions of a conflict between BITs and EU law and policy?
  - before the EU Court of Justice
  - before an Interstate Tribunal created according to a BIT

6. Basic references

MAURO, Gli accordi bilaterali sulla promozione e la protezione degli investimenti, Turin, 2003
POTESTÀ, Bilateral Investment Treaties and the European Union. Recent Developments in Arbitration and Before the ECJ, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2009
BURGSTALLER, European Law and Investment Law, Journal of International Arbitration, 2009
POULAIN, Quelques interrogations sur le statut des Traités bilatéraux de promotion et de protection des investissements au sein de l’Union Européenne, Revue générale de droit international public, 2007
TEYNIER, L’applicabilité des traités bilatéraux sur les investissements entre Etats membres de l’Union européenne, Cahiers de l’Arbitrage, 2008
MAURO, Accordi internazionali sugli investimenti e Unione Europea, Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2010

PART II

GENERAL ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

The Draft presented at the Naples Session contained the following points (Annuaire, vol. 73, pag. 559 f.), which are here reproduced for convenience.
I. The issues suggested for consideration at the Naples Session

1. The relations of BITs with customary law

The first question is whether the extremely numerous bilateral treaties on the protection of foreign investments, given to their substantially homogenous content, have determined the creation of a body of international customary law having an identical content and, thus, obliging also States not parties to BITs or in a measure additional to a possibly applicable BIT. For a positive answer to this question, cf. SCHWEBEL, ASIL Proc. 2004. Adde: REINISCH, ICSID Review 2009, 410 at 421; CHALAMISH, The future of BITs: a de facto multilateral agreement?, Brooklyn Journal of International Law 2008-2009, 305 at 314 ff.

The related point is how a positive answer to the above question is maintained and/or with what possible qualifications, in view of the developments relating to environment, public health and human rights, which have recently occurred.

The second question is whether a BIT, or even a series of BITs, represent a body of rules which are autonomous, as lex specialis, from the other rules of general international law, which cannot be used for interpreting or filling the possible lacunae of the BITs' regulation.

The related point is whether the above autonomy would be maintained also in respect to peremptory rules of international law.

The additional related point is whether the above autonomy is maintained and/or with what possible qualifications, in the case that the BITs or other international instruments make express references to international rules.

Adde: as to BITs interpretation, ARSANJANI, REISMAN, Interpreting treaties for the benefit of third parties: the “Salvors’ doctrine” and the use of the legislative history in investment treaties, AJIL 2010, p. 597 ff.


2. The relations of BITs with the selected arbitration mechanisms

The first question is whether in the case that an applicable BIT permits to the parties to choose between different kinds of mechanisms for the solution of their dispute, the rules of the BIT will be the only applicable rules or the rules of the chosen mechanism have also to be respected. The question especially applies to the ICSID requirements in the case of a BIT based arbitration.

The second question is whether the different kinds of arbitration mechanisms provided for in the BITs determine different kinds of substantive and/or procedural solutions of the disputes submitted.
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The related point is whether possible differences of prerequisites, solutions, and effects of the awards determine the choice of the mechanism made by the parties.

3. The interactions of international law with domestic law

a) As to the definition of Investment:

b) As to the definition of Investor:
   - Is nationality to be assessed exclusively on the basis of the relevant domestic law? Cf. Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates of 2004, where the Tribunal applied Italian law and considered that Italian nationality was not proved by the Investor, and Renta v. Russian Federation of 2009, where the Tribunal applied Spanish law and denied the status of Investor according to Spain-Russian Federation BIT to certain claimants not possessing full legal personality.

c) As to Regulatory Measures
   - Are nationalizations to be distinguished from expropriations?
   - Are Regulatory Measures to be distinguished from indirect and/or creeping expropriations?

II. The additional issues suggested for consideration

In addition to the above general issues already proposed for consideration at the Naples Session, new issues seem to emerge from recent developments in international case law, doctrine, especially connected to the entry into play of new actors on the scene of international investment law and arbitration.

1. The quest for an increased consideration of public interest in international investment law and arbitration

This well known issue has been raised since long time by States, particularly developing States but with increased insistence and more generally in recent times. A sure impact on the recent new attitude is due to the fact that some traditionally exporting States have became also investment-receiving States, and consequently, sometimes, respondents in investment arbitrations. In this
new economic financial contest it is envisageable that the protection of foreign investment has an adverse impact on the systems for protection of public interest adopted also in developed countries. At the Naples Session this demand for a better consideration of public or State interest has been stressed by LALIVE (Annuaire vol. 73, p. 564), BUCHER (ibidem 565), RANJEVA (ibidem 566), MAHIOU (ibidem 567). In this context and in addition to the section on Regulatory measures, Human Rights Protection deserves special consideration (cf. DUPUY, FRANCIONI, PETERSMANN, Human Rights in international investment law and arbitration, 2009).

It has also been noted by ABI SAAB (ibidem 566) that in investment arbitration the rules of international law are sometimes not properly interpreted and applied by tribunals composed by arbitrators more familiar with purely commercial disputes.

2. The impact of European Union on the international investment law and arbitration

As indicated supra, Part I, Section 4, an important influence towards an increased consideration and protection of public interest in international investment law and arbitration is going to be exercised by the EU following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. The modification of competences of the EU, now expressly including foreign direct investments within the exclusive competence of the Union, determines the participation of a new important actor in the field of international investment law and arbitration. As indicated supra, Part I, Section 4, in fine, the impact of this new actor appears capable of determining important evolutions in various sensitive areas, especially that of properly balance investors interests and public interest as established by States and presently also by the EU.

3. Some procedural issues in investment arbitration. The annulment of international arbitration awards: a challenge for the certainty and foreseeability of solutions?

Also this issue has a significant importance in investment arbitration. The analysis needs here to be bifurcated differentiating ICSID arbitration from non-ICSID arbitration.

Providing the BITs, which are the basis for the States consent to arbitration, offer various options for arbitration to the investor, the choice made by the latter is decisive. If ICSID arbitration is chosen, the procedure and the arbitral award will be governed by the Washington Convention. Thus, the award will have the proper nature of an international award, unprovided with a national seat and subject only to the international annulment procedure and annulment grounds provided for in Article 52 of the Convention.
If other kinds of arbitration are selected by the investor, the annulment procedure and grounds for annulment will be those provided for by the law of the seat of the arbitration and the arbitration rules that has been possibly chosen (such as the UNCITRAL Rules and the Rules of the Arbitration Institute of Stockholm).

In the situation described above, it appears that only within the ICSID system the problem can be properly raised as to the coherence of the international investment case law and the lack of certainty sometimes regretted because of the somehow diverging solutions offered by the various ad hoc committees charged with the annulment procedures (cf. CRIVELLARO, Annulment of ICSID Awards: back to the “first generation”?, Liber Amicorum Serge Lazareff, Paris, 2011, p. 145-175).

For these reasons and in this respect the issue has been raised of the opportunity of creating a stable appeal board within ICSID, similar to the Appellate Body of the WTO. This solution, somehow debated in the ICSID milieu, was suggested at the Naples Session by TOMUSCHAT, Annuaire, vol. 73, p. 565 f. and MAHIOU, ibidem, p. 567, but denied by EL KOSHERI, ibidem, p. 567.

In order to properly consider this issue, it should be taken into account that a possible stability of annulment solutions offered by ICSID court of appeal, could eventually reveal as an obstacle to the evolution to ICSID case law. Moreover, a possible stability increase of ICSID case law will have only an indirect influence on other kinds of investment arbitration which remain submitted to the selected arbitration rules and conclusively to the law of the seat of arbitration.

4. The new actors coming from the civil society. The intervention as amicus curiae and transparency in investment arbitration.

Reference is to be made in this respect of new actors coming from the s.c. civil society with their action in favour of the protection of public interest such as those in the field of human health and rights, labour, environment and generally in favour of transparency in investment arbitration.

In order to permit these actions to be exercised, various forms of participation are conceivable, particularly the intervention in the arbitration procedure by these actors as amici curiae. International practice shows a certain number of a precedents by the Appellate Body of the WTO, NAFTA, the Iran-US Tribunal and the European Court of Human Rights (on these precedents cf. BISHOP, CRAWFORD, REISMAN, Foreign Investment Disputes, 2005 p. 1504 ff.).

In the ICSID system nothing was initially provided but the need for third party participation and an increased transparency was underlined by STERN,

**PART III**

**THE GENERAL OUTLINE**

I. **The International Treaties considered**

1. **Bilateral Investment Treaties**
   - The Traditional Models (UK, Switzerland, France, Germany, USA)
   - Recent New Models (USA, Canada, Germany, Norway)
   - The Free Trade Agreements (EFTA – Singapore 2002, USA- Chile 2003; USA- Singapore 2004, USA – Australia 2004) and the Preferential Trade Agreements

2. **Multilateral Treaties**
   - The Washington Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States
   - The North American Free Trade Agreement
   - The Energy Charter Treaty
   - The Central American Free Trade Agreement
   - The Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment of 1998
II. The notion of Investment  
   (included in Part I presented at the Naples Session)

III. The notion of Investor  
    (included in Part I presented at the Naples Session)

IV. Treaty Claims and Contract Claims  
   (see Part II above)

V. The Parties' Consent to Arbitration  
    1. Arbitration Clause and the Agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute  
    2. The decline of the s.c. fork in the road and the new BIT Models  
    3. Arbitration Without Privity  
       (included in Part I presented at the Naples Session)
    4. Basis for the Consent of the State  
    5. Basis for the Consent of the Investor  

VI. The Law applicable to the Merits of the Dispute  
    1. Rules of Law chosen by the Parties  
    2. The Law of the Host State, including its conflict rules  
    3. International Law and its role

VII. The Procedural and Substantive Rights of the Investor  
    1. The MFN Clause and its impact on the procedural and substantive rights of Investors  
       (see Part I above)  
    2. Standards of Compensation for the Violation of Investors' Rights  
       a) Traditional Standard  
       b) Expropriation in violation of procedural and/or substantive applicable law, or the engagements undertaken  
       c) Fair and Equitable Treatment  
          (see Part I above)  
       d) Indirect Expropriation  
       e) Regulatory Measures  
          (included in Part I presented at the Naples Session)
VIII. The Proceedings

1. Confidentiality of the Proceedings
2. Intervention of Third Parties, written or oral pleadings serving as amici curiae

IX. Enforcement of the Awards and their Judicial Review

1. The traditional effects of International Arbitral Awards
2. Res Judicata Effect of ICSID Awards
3. Enforcement (ICSID Articles 54 and 55, NAFTA Article 1135)
   The traditional Judicial Review by the Judge of the Seat of the Arbitration
   ICSID Control Mechanism
   Grounds for Review
   Violation of international Rules of Treaty Interpretation as excès de pouvoir

X. The impact of the European Union on International Investment Law and arbitration
(see Part I above)
II. DELIBERATIONS DE L’INSTITUT

Onzième séance plénière Vendredi 9 septembre 2011 (après-midi)

La séance est ouverte à 17 h 45 sous la présidence de M. Roucounas.

Le Président invite le Rapporteur, M. Giardina, à présenter son rapport. Il regrette que le temps qui lui est accordé est malheureusement très limité et appelle le Rapporteur à être synthétique.

The Rapporteur was grateful to the President and the Secretary General for allowing him to present his Report to the plenary, however briefly. He recalled that the objective was to achieve a vote on a draft Resolution at the next session of the Institut and that many issues remained outstanding. Given the limited time afforded to him, however, he would focus on a series of major points, and was looking forward to hearing the comments of his consœurs and confrères.

The work of the Commission had originally focused on three issues: the notion of “investment”, the notion of “investor” and the issue of regulatory measures tantamount to indirect expropriation. Following recommendations made by the plenary at the Naples session, the Commission had then focused its work on another set of issues, as reflected in the Report that was posted on the website of the Institut in July 2011. The Report addressed: the distinction between treaty and contract claims; the issue of most favoured nation (“MFN”) clauses; and the concept of fair and equitable treatment (“FET”).

The Report provided a full review of the case law and doctrine in relation to MFN clauses, including on whether such clauses applied to substantive issues only or also to jurisdictional issues. The Report was equally comprehensive with respect to FET. It discussed, inter alia, whether the FET standard expressed in bilateral investment treaties differed from the minimum standard of customary international law, as referred to in Article 1105 of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Rapporteur hoped that the plenary could express its view on this topical issue.

The Report also highlighted the current status of discussions relating to the interactions between international investment law and the law of the European Union. The Rapporteur recalled that the Member States had
transferred an exclusive competence to the Union in that respect by the Lisbon Treaty. He noted that the European Court of Justice had already condemned three States (Finland, Austria and Sweden) for maintaining pre-existing bilateral investment treaties with third States, because such treaties ensured free capital transfers and thus infringed the competence of the Council of Ministers to enact restrictions on inbound and outbound capital flows. The Rapporteur also indicated that the European Union would soon enact legislation in relation to inward foreign investment. This showed that the EU was now an important new actor in the field of international investment law, although it was difficult so far to understand where the EU was heading. The overall goal of the Commission was always to preserve EU law; European institutions would thus always consider international investment law through the prism of potential violations of EU law, which may ultimately have a significant impact of that particular field of international law.

The Rapporteur concluded by noting that several members of the Commission were of the view that the scope of the Report was too wide and that the upcoming draft Resolution should focus on one of the issues mentioned above. Another potential topic could have been the protection of public interest in investor-State arbitration, as many arbitral tribunals tended to apply reasonings and arguments that were more appropriate to commercial arbitrations than to investment arbitrations.

The Rapporteur concluded by apologizing for the brevity of his presentation and reiterated that he was looking forward to the input of the plenary on the work of his Commission.

The President thanked the Rapporteur for his report and opened the floor for a very brief debate.

Mr Torres Bernardes congratulated the Rapporteur for his report in the name of the plenary. He hoped that the increased involvement of European institutions and EU law would result in a heightened sensitivity to the public interest among investor-State arbitral tribunals. He expressed the concern of many members of the Institut when stating that some arbitrators had been regrettably careless when it came to the protection of that public interest.

La séance est levée à 18 h 05.